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 Abstract 
In his excellent work The Assurance of things Hoped For
1
 surveying the 
development of the understanding of “faith” in the context of the Christian 
religion, Avery Dulles provides a concise sketch of the historical development 
and current manifestation of seven „models‟ of faith which still have some 
contemporary influence. This thesis takes each of the models of faith Dulles 
presents and gives a brief description of the model; offers some preliminary 
observations about the relationship between faith and reason in the respective 
models; and, by examining the Church‟s teaching on faith and reason in Fides et 
Ratio, discusses the relationship between faith and reason according to each 
model.  
                                                 
1
 Avery Dulles, The Assurance of Things Hoped For (New York, Oxford, 1994). 
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Models of Faith and Reason 
Peter Holmes 
Introduction 
In his excellent work The Assurance of things Hoped For
1
 surveying the development of 
the understanding of ―faith‖ in the context of the Christian religion, Avery Dulles 
provides a concise sketch of the most important understandings or models of faith which 
are still influential today. Dulles traces the historical development and current 
manifestation of seven ‗models‘ of faith which still have some contemporary influence. 
This thesis will take each of the models Dulles presents and give a brief description of 
the model, including some examples taken from proponents of the respective models; 
offer some preliminary observations about the relationship between faith and reason in 
the respective models; and, finally, by examining the Church‘s teaching on faith and 
reason in Fides et Ratio, discuss the relationship between faith and reason according to 
each model. My specific questions here are: 
Whether ―faith‖ is compatible with reason 
Whether ―faith‖ requires reason. 
I intend to argue that not only is faith compatible with reason, but that all models of faith 
described by Dulles require reason.  
 
This study is not attempting an historical and/or theological survey of the vast array of 
theologians and philosophers who have contributed to the development of various 
concepts of faith over the past two millennia. The theologians and works cited and 
                                                 
1
 Avery Dulles, The Assurance of Things Hoped For (New York, Oxford, 1994). 
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discussed in this thesis are presented primarily as examples of each model for the 
purposes of our study. While various authors and commentators on the topic of ‗Faith 
and Reason‘ and on Fides et Ratio specifically have been consulted in other sections, the 
sections offering commentary on each model based on Fides et Ratio have been treated, 
wherever possible, without external commentary in order to represent the Church‘s 
teaching as dispassionately and clearly as possible. 
 
Fides et Ratio 
Faith and reason are like two wings on which the human spirit rises 
to the contemplation of truth; and God has placed in the human heart 
a desire to know the truth—in a word, to know himself—so that, by 
knowing and loving God, men and women may also come to the 
fullness of truth about themselves (cf. Ex 33:18; Ps 27:8-9; 63:2-3; 
Jn 14:8; 1 Jn 3:2).
2
  
 
The Propositional Model 
The propositional ‗model‘ of faith described by Dulles is based on the assertion that it is 
impossible to believe anything which is not rationally conceivable. I cannot believe, for 
example, that ―blue Wednesdays fly twelve‖. Even if I memorised the words and 
believed the source of this bizarre assertion to be trustworthy, I could not grasp that 
which was being proposed to believe. In order to believe anything we must understand 
what is to be believed. The only access we have to such objects of belief is propositions. 
In this model, faith is assent to revealed truth on the authority of God who reveals, but 
―what is revealed and believed must be a sentence.‖3 Swinburne makes this point 
forcefully in refuting the assertion, mistakenly attributed to Tertullian, that Jesus‘ life, 
                                                 
2
 John Paul II, “Fides et Ratio”, (hereafter F&R) in Fides et Ratio: Faith and Reason (Strathfield, St 
Pauls Publications, 1998), Opening paragraph. 
3
 Dulles, The Assurance of Things Hoped For, p172 (attributed to William Marshner) 
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death and resurrection is worthy of belief because it is absurd. After showing a few ways 
in which such an assertion could have been made intelligibly,
4
 Swinburne insists that he 
would refute such a statement on the grounds that ―there are logical limits to the 
possibilities for human irrationality, and even Tertullian cannot step outside them.‖5 
 
The propositional model seems to find some support in the Scriptures. In the Old 
Testament the people of Israel are invited to receive the laws of the covenant, to ―write 
them on your doorframes of your houses and on your gates.‖6 The covenant of God with 
his chosen people seems to take the form of specific propositions. The law is 
emphatically pronounced from the stone tablets Moses brings from the mountain, 
placing great emphasis on the fact they are written, literally carved in stone, for all to 
see, seek to understand and to do.
7
 In the New Testament Christ himself affirms that all 
of God‘s Word is eternal.8 He insists that man shall live ―by every word that comes from 
the mouth of God.‖9  
                                                 
4
 Richard Swinburne, Faith and Reason - Second Edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 23-24. 
―There are ways in which we can interpret Tertullian as making an intelligible claim. … ‗Absurd‘ could 
be taken to mean ‗apparently absurd‘, and ‗impossible‘ to mean ‗impossible by normal standards‘. 
Tertullian might be saying that one would not expect a true claim about a matter of very deep significance 
to look plausible or likely at a first glance by the average person… he might be saying that because the 
most significant and fundamental events must be very different from normal ones, they will be impossible 
if one supposes that only normal events occur - so a claim about such a happening would be more likely to 
be true if it concerned the apparently impossible.‖ 
5
 Swinburne, Faith and Reason - Second Edition, 24. ―If Tertullian believes that all the evidence is against 
a proposition, he must believe that that proposition is improbable, and in that case he cannot believe that it 
is true. He may die rather than deny the proposition in public; he may, in some sense, plan his life on the 
assumption that the proposition is true, but he does not believe it. There are logical limits to the 
possibilities for human irrationality, and even Tertullian cannot step outside them.‖ 
6
 Dt 6:9, 11:20. 
7
 Ex 24:7, Dt 6:6-7, Ps 19:7-11, Ps 119. 
8
 Mt 5:18. ―Not one letter, not the least stroke of a pen will disappear from the law.‖ cf Mt 24:35, Mk 
13:31, Lk 16:17, 21:33, Isa 40:8, Ps 119:89-91. 
9
 Mt 4:4 (citing Dt 8:3) Emphasis mine. 
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On the other hand, it could be argued that the covenant cannot be reduced to mere 
propositions. It describes a relationship between God and his people. The covenant 
contains a great deal more physical action or ceremony than specific propositions. The 
establishment of the covenant itself includes a few verses of commandments, followed 
by approximately forty chapters consisting largely of liturgical instructions.
10
 The 
purpose of various parts of the text of the covenant notwithstanding, the text is still 
written propositions. Even the liturgical instructions making up a significant proportion 
of the covenant are still expressed in words, sentences and coherent propositions. Even 
the poetic, at times mystical, exploration of faith in the Psalms and wisdom literature is 
completely focussed on ―the Law of the Lord‖ as the central focus of faith.11 We see this 
theme expanded in the New Testament, particularly in the Pastoral Epistles. Bishops are 
exhorted to firmly hold and teach the ―deposit of faith‖12 and to transmit it using the 
―sound pattern of words‖13 which has been handed down to them.14 In the late second 
century and early third, Irenaeus and Tertullian reflect the biblical themes emphasising 
doctrines proclaimed by the apostles, as proposed, interpreted and guarded by the 
Church.
15
  
 
                                                 
10
 Laws and advice on moral matters are often interwoven with liturgical instructions but the point 
remains that these instructions are primarily liturgical, and other matters are placed into a liturgical 
context with liturgical implications. cf John W. Kleinig, Leviticus (St Louis: Concordia, 2003), 22. 
11
 For example Ps 19, 119. 
12
 1 Tm 6:20, 2 Tm 1:14. 
13
 1 Tm 1:13. 
14
 cf 1 Cor 11:2, 15:3, Gal 1:12, Eph 4:20. 
15
 Adv. haer., I.10.1-2 in Alexander Roberts & James Donaldson, Eds. Ante-Nicene Fathers Vol. 1 (Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1975), 330-331. ―The Church, though dispersed throughout the whole world, even to 
the ends of the earth, has received from the apostles and their disciples this faith ... she proclaims them, 
and teaches them, and hands them down, with perfect harmony, as if she possessed only one mouth. ... 
Nor will any one of the rulers in the Churches, however highly gifted he may be in point of eloquence, 
teach doctrines different from these.‖ cf. Dulles, The Assurance of Things Hoped For, 21. ―Irenaeus is 
particularly concerned to defend faith in the objective sense as the heritage received the apostles whose 
writings are ―the ground and pillar‖ of our faith.‖ (citing 1 Tm 3:15). 
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St Thomas seems to support this model of faith in defining faith as ―to think with 
assent‖ to proposed truth.16 Although the believer cannot truly assent to propositions he 
has not yet heard or understood, he is ―bound to believe such things explicitly, when it is 
clear to him that they are contained in the doctrine of faith.‖17 Following St Thomas, 
John Duns Scotus (1265-1308) insisted that truth must be expressed in rational 
propositions in order for reason to grasp it, even if supernatural faith infallibly 
guarantees it.
18
 Centuries later, the sixth canon of the Council of Trent incorporated the 
Scotist theme that faith is assent to revealed truth.
19
 
 
Standing astride the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as both the climax of 
rationalism and yet ―curiously modern,‖20 Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) believed faith 
could be described in rational terms,
21
 treating ‗faith‘ as assent to certain propositions 
                                                 
16
 T.C. O‘Brien, St Thomas Aquinas – Summa Theologiae Vol.31 (New York, Cambridge Press, 2006) ST 
II.II, 2.2, Art.1. 
17
 O‘Brien, St Thomas Aquinas – Summa Theologiae ST II.II, 2.2, Art.5. ―Therefore, as regards the 
primary points or articles of faith, man is bound to believe them, just as he is bound to have faith; but as to 
other points of faith, man is not bound to believe them explicitly, but only implicitly, or to be ready to 
believe them, in so far as he is prepared to believe whatever is contained in the Divine Scriptures. Then 
alone is he bound to believe such things explicitly, when it is clear to him that they are contained in the 
doctrine of faith.‖ 
18
 Richard Cross, Great Medieval Thinkers – Duns Scotus (New York, Oxford University Press, 1999), 
13. ―The correct way of trying to understand revealed truth, for Scotus, necessarily involves a defense of 
what we would call the philosophical coherence of such truth. Theology, for Scotus, is a deeply rational 
exercise.‖ 
19
 The Council of Trent Decree concerning Justification Ch.VI ―they are disposed to that justice when, 
aroused and aided by divine grace, receiving faith by hearing, they are moved freely toward God, 
believing to be true what has been divinely revealed and promised.‖ 
http://history.hanover.edu/texts/trent/ct06.html (accessed 13, April 2010). 
20
 Colin Brown, Philosophy and the Christian Faith (Downers Grove, Intervarsity, 1968), 91. 
21
 ―In [Religion within Limits of Reason (1793)], conscientiousness and true respect for the Christian 
religion but also the principle of proper freedom of thought have led me to conceal nothing. On the 
contrary, I have presented everything openly, as I believe I see the possible union of the latter with the 
purest possible reason.‖ Letter dated 4 May 1793 (Gesammelte Schriften, XI, p. 429, No.574) cited in 
Colin Brown, Philosophy and the Christian Faith, 92. 
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based on various kinds of evidence.
 22
 Kant believed that assent to some truth is a ―moral 
necessity.‖ He proposed that it would be absurd to believe there are absolute moral 
principles without ever being able to hope for them to become a total reality. He insisted 
that a rational world is a completely moral world.
23
 Given that morality fails to be lived 
perfectly in this existence he proposed that it is necessary to believe in a future existence 
where morality is perfected and justice enacted, or the universe would not be rational. In 
short, he argues for the existence of God and an afterlife on the basis of what ought to 
be.
24
 Treating faith as purely rational, Kant displays great optimism in the power of 
reason, indeed, he places his religious hope in it.
25
 
 
The First Vatican Council insisted that faith is assent to truth, which the authority of 
God guarantees.
 26
 The Council assumes that grace is at work in all levels of faith but 
insists that ―all things are to be believed which are contained in the Word of God as 
                                                 
22
Dulles, The Assurance of Things Hoped For, 70-71. ―Kant describes 3 levels of faith, 1) an educated 
guess, such as a doctor‘s diagnosis based on an educated assessment of a patient‘s symptoms, but by no 
means the only possible reasonable conclusion 2) a persuasive argument, whereby we are convinced by 
overwhelming, though still not infallibly certain, evidence and 3) a moral necessity.‖ 
23
 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 808: cited in Paul Guyer, Kant, (Abingdon, Routledge, 2008), 231. ―I 
call the world as it would be if it were in conformity with all the moral laws (as it can be in accordance 
with the freedom of rational beings and should be in accordance with the necessary laws of morality) a 
moral world... an intelligible world.‖  
24
 Sebastian Gardner, Kant and the Critique of Pure Reason, (London, Routledge, 1999), 315. ―We would 
be entitled to base belief in God‘s existence on what ought to be – on the existence of obligation – rather 
than on what is.‖ 
25Marilyn McCord Adams believes that Pope John Paul II exceeds Kant‘s optimism about internal 
certainty in claiming that certainty about some external questions is a condition of a successful search for 
meaning of life. cf. McCord Adams, Marilyn, ―Sceptical Realism: Faith and Reason in Collaboration‖ in 
Anthony Fisher & Hayden Ramsay, Faith and Reason – Friends or Foes in the New Millennium? 
(Adelaide, ATF Press, 2004), 11. 
26
 Berard Marthaler, The Creed – The Apostolic Faith in Contemporary Theology (New London: Twenty-
Third Publications, 2007), 32-33. ―The Constitution Dei Filius ... presents revelation primarily as the 
communication of supernatural truth inaccessible to natural reason, and faith as the acceptance of revealed 
truth.‖ 
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found in Scripture and Tradition, and which are proposed by the Church.‖27 For the First 
Vatican Council the object of faith is the revealed truth of God in the Scriptures and in 
Tradition (mediated with certainty by the Church). Faith is a form of knowledge based 
on divine authority (although the First Vatican Council did not deny faith has other 
aspects). While Vatican I emphasises the reasonableness of faith, it rejected blind 
‗decisionism‘ by an appeal to the public character of revelation and faith.  
 
In a motu proprio (Sept 1, 1910), Pius X issued his ‗oath against modernism‘. 
According to the motu proprio, God can be known by natural reason and evidence. The 
Church was founded by the real, revealed and historical Christ; dogmas do not ‗evolve‘ 
into something other than what the Church initially held. Faith, according to the motu 
proprio is intellectual assent to truth which is external to us. This truth is accepted as 
true on the basis of God‘s authority.28   
 
More recently, thinkers such as Germain Grisez, one of the most significant contributors 
to modern moral thought,
29
 seem to promote a propositional model of faith. In 
                                                 
27
 First Vatican Council ―Dogmatic Constitution on the Catholic Faith‖, Session 3, Canon 8. Also relevant 
is Session 3, Canon 3. ―With the grace of God inspiring us and assisting us we believe to be true what he 
has revealed.  
28
 Pius X, Motu propriu (Sept 1, 1910) “Oath against Modernism.” ―Faith is not a blind sentiment of 
religion welling up from the depths of the subconscious under the impulse of the heart and pressure of the 
informed will, but is a genuinely intellectual assent to truth received from outside by hearing, whereby we 
accept as true, on the authority of God who is supremely truthful, that which has been said, attested and 
revealed by the personal God, our Creator and Lord.‖ 
29
 Janet E. Smith, Humanae Vitae - A Generation Later (USA, Catholic University of America, 1991), 
340. 
 ―The work in ethics of Germain Grisez and his associates, Joseph Boyle, John Finnis and William May, 
especially their critique of consequentialism and proportionalism, has made an enormous contribution to 
contemporary Catholic moral thought.‖ 
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opposition to writers such as Rahner, O‘Collins, McBrien and Schillebeeckx, Grisez 
insists on adherence to the Church‘s propositions in matters of moral life.30  
 
It is worth noting that some recent evangelical Protestant theologians seem to support a 
propositional model of faith. Gordon H Clark defines faith as assent to propositions
31
 
and his colleague Carl Henry warns that, without assent to propositions faith is no 
longer ―identifiably Christian.‖32 
 
Preliminary thoughts on the Propositional Model 
The basic concepts of human communication, understanding propositions, and 
comprehending and assessing the reliability of their source, all require the basic skills 
which belong to the realm of reason. I cannot begin to believe, for example, the 
proposition that ―blue Wednesdays fly twelve‖. No matter what my assessment of the 
reliability of the source of such an utterance, the sentence is impossible to believe until 
the words are defined in such a way that I could comprehend what was proposed by it. 
The sentence must be logical. It must propose something that is comprehensible in order 
for anyone to believe it. The exercise of hearing and analysing the sentence is a rational 
process.  
                                                 
30
 Germain Grisez, The Way of the Lord Jesus, Vol I Ch.1.Q.C, 4. ―All faithful Christians are forbidden to 
defend as legitimate conclusions of science such opinions that are known to be opposed to the doctrine of 
faith, … The phrase ―doctrine of faith‖ used here must not be limited to truths solemnly defined. It also 
includes at least those truths of faith and morals proposed by the ordinary and universal magisterium of 
the Church as truths to be held definitively.‖  
31
 Gordon, H. Clark, Atheism ―The Trinity Review‖, July/August, 1983, 5. ―There is a definite reason why 
not everything can be deduced. If one tried to prove the axioms of geometry, one must refer back to prior 
propositions. If these too must be deduced, there must be previous propositions, and so on back ad 
infinitum. From which it follows: If everything must be demonstrated, nothing can be demonstrated, for 
there would be no starting point. If you cannot start, then you surely cannot finish‖ cf. Dulles, The 
Assurance of Things Hoped For, 171. ―Faith, by definition, is assent to understood propositions.‖ 
32
 Dulles, The Assurance of Things Hoped For, 171. ―Faith divorced from assent to propositions ... [is] 
neither identifiably Christian nor akin to authentic belief.‖ 
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Assent to the propositions engages the mind in an act of will and intellect. Even further, 
offering a defence (apologetic) of the proposition engages the powers of reason built on 
the foundation of revelation. 
 
Dulles raises the problem that this model seems to restrict belief to that which has been 
proposed. That is, if we insist that a concept cannot be believed if it cannot be 
formulated in a sentence, then we eliminate the possibility of belief in parts of the 
‗mystery‘ which have not yet been clearly expressed in propositions.33 Dulles cites the 
adage ―we know more than we can say‖ to illustrate his point that this model seems to 
overlook ―the mystical dimensions of human knowledge.‖34 It is hard, however, to 
imagine we could believe X, even if X were ‗revealed‘ in a mystical manner, if X were 
not in some way proposed rationally. The ―mystical‖ source of such a proposition would 
not alter the need to comprehend the proposition in order to assent to it. Even if the 
mystical source alluded to knowledge unable to be proposed, this would not indicate that 
it is possible to believe X without X being proposed for belief. If the mystical source 
somehow inspired belief in something without specifically proposing anything, then it 
seems that the proposition proposed for belief is that there is something worth believing 
which has not (yet) been explicitly proposed, which is in itself a proposition.  
 
It would seem that sentences or propositions describe reality, and that this reality is the 
object of belief rather than the sentences themselves. Specifically, the real object of 
                                                 
33
 Also relevant is Henri DeLubac, Paradoxes of Faith (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1987), 228. ―Faith, 
if it be really faith, is always one, always entire. It envelops the totality of its object – even in those parts 
of it which have not yet been made plain, or in those aspects which have not yet been explored.‖ 
34
 Dulles, The Assurance of Things Hoped For, 172. 
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belief is a person, the first and ultimate Truth, and not a proposition. To believe is to 
assent that X is the case, which presupposes that X must first be expressed in the form of 
a rational proposition. But the believer assents to the reality of X and not merely the 
proposition that X is the case. 
 
Although propositions describe reality, they necessarily do so within the limits of 
language. The use of language carries with it all the limitations of language. Language 
assumes the cultural understanding and philosophical assumptions of that language. It is 
one thing to insist a dogmatic formula composed with the language of the sixteenth 
century, using language filled with the cultural and philosophical assumptions of the 
sixteenth century and which sought to respond to specific issues arising in that same 
century has been protected from formal error by the charism of infallibility. It is quite 
another thing to insist that this formula has expressed the truth perfectly and completely 
for all people, for all time.
35
 There is a danger in a system that demands such precision 
of belief of what Ralph McInerny calls ―philosophical pride.‖36 While absolutising one‘s 
own ideas may produce legitimate systems of thought, McInerny suggests that a proper 
approach to philosophy takes into account the inherent weaknesses in all systems.
37
 This 
recognition allows for a legitimate plurality of thought systems. Not in suggesting that 
                                                 
35
 cf. F&R, 84 and 94. 
36
 Ralph McInerney, ―The Scandal of Philosophy: Reconciling Different Philosophical Systems 
According to Fides et Ratio‖ in Fisher & Ramsay, Faith and Reason – Friends or Foes in the New 
Millennium?, 28. 
37
 Ralph McInerny, ―The Scandal of Philosophy: Reconciling Different Philosophical Systems According 
to Fides et Ratio‖ in Fisher & Ramsay, Faith and Reason – Friends or Foes in the New Millennium?, 28. 
―Pluralism is legitimate so long as it recognises the partial and imperfect nature of each of the systems 
with respect to the truth.‖ (McInerny still insists (ibid, 30) that faith provides a ―negative criterion‖ for 
philosophy.)  
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mutually contradictory systems should be considered ‗true‘ at the same time, but by 
acknowledging that both systems are partial and imperfect representations of reality.
38
  
 
Finally, it is worth noting Swinburne‘s point that our reasons for holding a proposition 
may change over time, while we still hold to the same proposition. We may, says 
Swinburn, hold a proposition to be true on the basis of our research, and later hold the 
same proposition to be true on the basis of having faith in the conclusions of this 
research long after forgetting almost all of the relevant details.
39
 To push Swinburne‘s 
example further, we could hold a proposition to be true simply because it presents the 
only logical answer to a question, but later, when we are exposed to evidence supporting 
the proposition our reasons may change even if the proposition we believe in does not.
40
  
 
The Propositional Model in Fides et Ratio 
Positive 
Even in the opening paragraphs of Fides et Ratio we can discern a particular concern for 
and emphasis on specific truth located in formal revelation as the proper object of faith. 
  
                                                 
38
 McInerny notes (ibid, 29) that John Paul II‘s insistence that philosophy begins with sense perception 
and experience necessarily excludes the philosophy of Descartes at the very least, adding a touch of the 
ironic to the irenic approach of the encyclical.  
39
 Swinburne, Faith and Reason - Second Edition, 21-22. ―A person may continue to believe a proposition 
while his evidence for it changes. I may a few years ago have assembled a lot of historical evidence 
which, I believed, made it probable that Jesus was raised physically from the dead. I therefore believed the 
latter proposition. I may now have forgotten the historical evidence, and yet continue to believe that Jesus 
was raised. My evidence now may be only that I once did, honestly and conscientiously, examine 
historical evidence and reach the conclusion that Jesus was raised. This evidence about my past 
investigation may be my present grounds for belief.‖ 
40
 St Thomas Aquinas insists that believing something to be true on the basis we have evidence for it is 
not properly faith. (2a.2ae,1.4) Obrien, St Thomas Aquinas: Summa Theologiae Vol.31, 21-23.  
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The Church ... received the gift of the ultimate truth about human 
life. ... It is her duty to serve humanity in different ways, but one way 
in particular imposes a responsibility of a quite special kind: the 
diakonia of the truth.
41
 
 
It describes the bishops of the Church as the ones ―who share the mission of 
“proclaiming the truth openly” (2 Cor 4:2)”. It points to the bishops as “witnesses of the 
divine and Catholic truth” especially for the benefit of the young who, without such 
guidance, have “no valid points of reference.”42 
 
The Church can declare herself as bearer of the message
43
 which God himself has 
revealed because God not only desires to make himself known, but provides sufficient 
revelation to enable us to understand and believe in Him. The God who cannot deceive 
us, nor desires to
44
, has entrusted revealed truths to his entire people but charged the 
Magisterium with the task of providing authoritative boundaries within which the 
faithful can go about interpreting this revelation. John Paul II seems to support the idea 
that God has revealed himself in the form of propositions when he reiterates the canons 
of the First Vatican Council, ―there are proposed for our belief mysteries hidden in God 
which, unless they are divinely revealed, cannot be known.”45 
 
The conviction that faith is grounded in propositions has its origin in the very sentences 
of Scripture which propose things for us to believe. Indicating that the authors “intended 
                                                 
41
 F&R, 2. 
42
 F&R, 6. Also relevant is F&R, 22 ―If something is true, then it must be true for all people and at all 
times.‖ 
43
 F&R, 7. 
44
 F&R, 8. 
45
 F&R, 9 citing Dei Filius, IV DS 3015. 
8 July 2010 Page 13 
to formulate true statements, capable ... of expressing objective reality”46 Fides et Ratio 
can confidently assert that “faith clearly presupposes that human language is capable of 
expressing divine and transcendent reality in a universal way... otherwise there would be 
no Revelation of God.”47 
 
This is not to suggest that any human language is capable of expressing the entirety of 
divine truth. The document compares the condescension of the second Person of the 
Trinity becoming incarnate with the condescension of God expressing at least a portion 
of his infinite truth within the mundane boundaries of human language.
48
 Within the 
boundaries of this human language a theologian seeks to understand the meaning of 
what is proposed for his belief.
49
  
 
Although acknowledging that human language and even our reason are retarded by sin, 
imperfections and prejudices, Fides et Ratio still confidently asserts that human 
language is capable of expressing “unchanging and ultimate truth”50 even surpassing the 
usual limits of language.
51
 Fides et Ratio warns against “abandonment of the traditional 
terminology”52 on the basis that the dogmatic propositions of the Church are not merely 
                                                 
46
 F&R, 82. 
47
 F&R, 84. 
48
 F&R, 94. ―Human language thus embodies the language of God, who communicates his own truth with 
that wonderful ―condescension‖ which mirrors the logic of the Incarnation.‖ 
49
 F&R, 94. ―In interpreting the sources of Revelation, then, the theologian needs to ask what is the deep 
and authentic truth which the texts wish to communicate, even within the limits of language.‖ 
50
 F&R, 95. 
51
 F&R, 95. ―Human language may be conditioned by history and constricted in other ways, but the 
human being can still express truths which surpass the phenomenon of language.‖ 
52
 F&R, 55. (In Raimond Gaita, ―Moral Inquiry in a Catholic University‖ in Anthony Fisher & Hayden 
Ramsay, Faith and Reason – Friends or Foes in the New Millennium? (Adelaide, ATF Press, 2004), 98. 
Gaita opines that ―the longstanding traditions of Catholic moral philosophy, do not ... constitute a 
discipline‖ in themselves, but he acknowledge certain characteristics of a Catholic philosopher which 
separates them from a non-Catholic philosopher.) 
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human attempts to express the divine reality, but genuine expressions of the divine truth 
in human forms. The attempt to express religious truth necessarily draws on philosophy, 
even transforming philosophy as it makes use of it
53
 to propose the revealed truth with 
ever increasing clarity “in order to express the true doctrine about God.”54 
 
Against the relativists of various kinds, Fides et Ratio asserts that the truth 
communicated in divine revelation is not confined to a particular culture, place or time 
so that all men and women find in it the ultimate truth and meaning of their lives.
55
 
Going further, the author insists that man cannot discern grave matters such as what is 
―good and evil‖ alone but is ―constrained to appeal to a higher source.‖56 Although 
conceding a limited value in various imperfect means of searching for truth the 
document insists that ―since Christian truth has a salvific value, any one of these paths 
may be taken, as long as it leads to the final goal, that is to the Revelation of Jesus 
Christ.‖57  
 
In addition to the use of philosophy to comprehend and utilise ―the various forms and 
functions of language‖ in order to facilitate the clear communication of the truth58, 
reason comes strongly into play in comprehending, interpreting and communicating the 
divinely revealed propositions, not only in grasping the logical and conceptual structure 
of the propositions in which the Church's teaching is framed, but also, indeed primarily, 
                                                 
53
 F&R, 39. 
54
 F&R, 39. 
55
 F&R, 12. 
56
 F&R, 22. 
57
 F&R, 38. 
58
 F&R, 65. ―Philosophy [prepares] for a correct auditus fidei with its study of the structure of knowledge 
and personal communication, especially the various forms and functions of language.‖ 
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in bringing to light the salvific meaning of these propositions for the individual and for 
humanity.
59
 
 
Far from rendering propositions useless, the doubt that sin creates is the reason for 
reliance on rigorous use of philosophical method in careful interpretation of the 
propositions of revelation. Faith liberates reason from its limitations
60
 and it is from our 
understanding of ―the sum of these propositions‖ that we come to know the truth.61  
 
The task of the theologian, according to this model of faith, is to utilise philosophical 
insight and method to comprehend, develop and communicate ―this certain and 
unchangeable doctrine” to each age, in response to the various challenges and needs of 
the people of God.
62
 
 
Negative 
It would seem that Fides et Ratio does not so much suggest that the propositional model 
of faith is incorrect so much as it is limited. While it is true that God reveals himself 
through definitive statements and specific dogmatic formulations, these sentences 
present the object of faith to us in human phrases, but the object of faith is properly God. 
Fides et Ratio insists that ―only in the mystery of the incarnate Word does the mystery 
of man take on light.‖63 The object of our faith is not sentences but a person. Even 
                                                 
59
 F&R, 66. 
60
 F&R, 43. ―Illumined by faith, reason is set free from the fragility and limitations deriving from the 
disobedience of sin and finds the strength necessary to rise to the knowledge of the Triune God.‖ 
61
 F&R, 66. 
62
 F&R, 92. 
63
 F&R, 12. (citing Gaudium et Spes, 22). 
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sentences of divine revelation itself are the ―Word made flesh‖64 who reveals himself 
and, in doing so, the entire Godhead. Placing faith in mere propositions could carry even 
more danger than merely falling short of understanding and knowing God. To be sure, 
believing in a person involves believing what that person reveals about themselves. This 
model points beyond the propositions themselves to the truth which they express, and 
always looks to that ever reliable truth to confirm and increase our understanding of 
what has been revealed. Lacking the guidance, respect and proper love of the person 
who is the object of faith could lead to a distorted understanding of God, as the failings 
of human reason can obscure even revealed truth.
65
 This is not to suggest that 
proponents of the propositional model reject the work of the Holy Spirit or the person of 
Christ. Nevertheless it is worth noting that, in their emphasis on the propositions 
themselves, there is a danger of placing insufficient emphasis on God as the object of 
true faith and on the person of Jesus Christ as the living Word of God, the Word made 
flesh. The proper object of faith is God himself, not primarily the propositions which 
lead us to and proclaim this object.  
 
Another issue raised by Fides et Ratio which presents a problem for the propositional 
model is that of our flawed nature. By virtue of our fallen nature, our reason is not 
perfect
66
, our motives not always reliable and the philosophy we utilise in our struggle 
to express the truth can itself be seriously flawed.
67
 Further still, the very formulations 
                                                 
64
 F&R, 7 (citing Dei Verbum, 2). 
65
 F&R, 28. ―The natural limitation of reason and the inconsistency of the heart often obscure and distort a 
person‘s search.‖ 
66
 F&R, 75. ―[Philosophy is] seriously handicapped by the inherent weakness of human reason.‖ 
67
 F&R, 49. ―History shows that philosophy ... has taken wrong turns and fallen into error.‖ 
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are affected by our human limitations.
68
 On top of all this, we may even flee from the 
revealed truth because we are “afraid of its demands.”69 
 
It is here that every attempt to reduce the Father's saving plan to 
purely human logic is doomed to failure. “Where is the one who is 
wise? Where is the learned? Where is the debater of this age? Has 
not God made foolish the wisdom of the world?” (1 Cor 1:20)70 
 
Conclusion to the Propositional Model 
We have seen that the propositional model, properly understood, does not suggest we 
believe in propositions but, rather, that propositions are the believers‘ efforts to 
coherently describe the mysteries of God. The proponents of the propositional model, 
supported by Fides et Ratio, argue that, despite the various difficulties faced by reason, 
it is still possible for reason to discover, discern and describe truth. We have seen that it 
is impossible to believe something if we do not understand what is to be believed. Even 
if God has revealed some truth directly to us, we must use reason to decipher its 
meaning in order to assent to it. To ‗think with assent‘, the Christian person needs 
reason to deduce how particular propositions coherently interrelate with other 
propositions of faith. In fact, it is only through the logical structures of human language 
that the believer is able to express truths about God and seek to ‗believe‘ in any 
meaningful sense. Uncertainty, difficulty and doubt do not deter proponents of this 
model from their optimism regarding reason. They are, rather, spurred on to more 
diligent and rigorous application of reason in their search for truth.  
                                                 
68
 F&R, 51. ―it is necessary to keep in mind the unity of truth, even if its formulations are shaped by 
history and produced by human reason wounded and weakened by sin.‖ 
69
 F&R, 28. 
70
 F&R, 23. 
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The Transcendental Model 
The second model of faith described by Avery Dulles is based on the emphasis on 
supernatural faith as necessary for supernatural understanding. Faith is not so much 
adherence to dogmatic propositions but a gift of transformation, given and freely 
accepted, which enlightens and moves the human spirit towards God. This gift is a 
totally new perspective, allowing man to reach and understand things far above his 
natural reason. Although Dulles attributes this view almost exclusively to Rahner and 
his 20
th
 century contemporaries,
71
 it could be argued that some of its foundational ideas 
can be traced back to the Scriptures, even if these were only developed to the present 
extent relatively recently. 
 
A strong theme in Biblical wisdom literature, specifically, ―the fear of the Lord is the 
beginning of wisdom‖72 and related sentiments,73  directly links human wisdom with a 
proper attitude of awe and respect for God‘s majesty. In the New Testament, St Paul 
urges his readers to be transformed by a renewal of their mind
74
 which he describes as 
uniting with the mind of Christ.
75
 It could be argued that the Scriptures support the idea 
that a general disposition inclined toward the divine naturally inclines us to greater 
understanding.
76
 A particular attitude or state of mind is necessary for obtaining 
wisdom. 
 
                                                 
71
 Dulles, The Assurance of Things Hoped For, 173. 
72
 e.g. Ps 111:10, Pr 1:7, 9:10. 
73
 e.g. Pr 15:33 ―The fear of the Lord teaches a man‖, 16:6 ―through fear of the Lord a man avoids evil.‖  
74
 Rom 12:2. 
75
 Php 2:5. 
76
 cf. The call of wisdom in Pr 1:20-33, 3:13-20, 8:1-36 & 9:1-12. 
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As early as the first century of Christian history, Pope Clement I, in his lectures to 
catechumens, teaches that faith opens the eyes of our hearts to the truth of God.
77
 St 
Cyril of Jerusalem (315-386) held that our reason is ‗enlightened‘ by faith conferred in 
baptism
78
 and St Augustine (354-430) famously proposed that ―unless you believe you 
will not understand.‖79 Augustine believes that some truths of the faith are impossible to 
understand without the gift of faith.
80
  
 
Perhaps the most significant contributor to the development of the relationship between 
faith and reason, St Thomas Aquinas, referred to a lumen fides, that is, a ―light of faith‖ 
which enlightens our natural reason and orders the believer towards the things of God.
81
 
Far from claiming that this is an achievement of our natural reason alone, Thomas 
insists that the light is Christ himself, who enlightens us and inclines us towards the 
good.
82
 Centuries later saw something of a revival of St Thomas‘s view in Pierre 
Rousselot (1878-1915) who described faith as an active power of discernment given to 
the mind. Rousselot developed the Thomistic theme of faith as a living connaturality 
with the things of God
83
 by describing the intellect in terms of its final goal, God.
84
  Karl 
                                                 
77
 Clement I First letter to the Corinthians, 36. ―By [Christ] the eyes of hearts are opened. By Him our 
foolish and darkened understanding blossoms up anew towards his marvellous light.‖ in Cyril Richardson, 
Library of Christian Classics, Vol I – Early Christian Fathers, (London, SCM, 1953). 
78
 Phillip Schaff, Nicene and Post Nicene Fathers, Series II, Vol 11 - Lectures on the Article ―and on one 
Holy Ghost, the comforter, which spak by the prophets‖ Lecture XVI, 16 and lecture XVII, 36. 
79
 Ep 70:1:3-4 ―Nisi credideritis, non intelligetis‖ seems to be a Latin translation of Is 7:9 (from LXX) 
according to Dulles, The Assurance of Things Hoped For, 27. 
80
 Augustine also refers to Is 7:9 ―unless you believe you shall not understand‖ (from LXX) in his 
commentary In Psalm., 118; Serm., 18:3 in Dulles, The Assurance of Things Hoped For, 27. 
81
 2a.2ae.1.4. Ad3 ―The light of faith does make one see the things believed in.‖ O‘brien, St Thomas 
Aquinas – Summa Theologiae Vol.31 (Also relevant is 2a.2ae,1.5. Ad1; and 2a.2ae.2.3 Ad2). 
82
 Thomas Aquinas, The Collected Works of St. Thomas Aquinas: Electronic edition. (InteLex 
Corporation, 1993), p71. Commenting on John 1:9 ―He [the Word] was the true light, which enlightens 
every man coming into this world.‖) 
83
 Avery Dulles, introducing Pierre Rousselot, The Eyes of Faith: With Rousselot's Answer to Two Attacks 
(New York, Fordham, 1990), 17. ―By defining the intellect in terms of its final object, God, Rousselot 
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Adam (1876-1966) continued to build on Aquinas‘ idea, describing faith as a light 
which illuminates the intellect and opens it to what is divine and holy. The assent of 
faith is affected by the will when it recognises in Christ the summum bonum which is the 
fulfilment of the entire person. Adam proposes that the inquirer must abandon the 
objective, impersonal, scientific approach and be reverently attentive to a message that 
involves the entire person since Christ is not a mere set of proposals but a living person 
who communicates himself through the life of the Church. This seems to represent a 
departure from St Thomas in that Thomas insisted that the light of faith orders one 
towards the articles of faith, and is not indifferent to them.
85
 St Edith Stein (1891-
1942AD) provides a healthy clarification to this theme, insisting that the light of faith 
makes us less vulnerable to error, but not completely preserved from making mistakes.
86
 
 
In his Introduction to Theology Abelard (1079-1142AD) taught that reason can achieve 
a kind of ‗primordial faith‘87 which, while not able to gain us salvation, predisposes us 
towards the divine gift of supernatural faith which saves. John Duns Scotus further 
developed the idea that human reason needs healing after the fall but that, when healed 
by faith, human reason resumes its search for understanding which is proper to its 
                                                                                                                                               
recalled St Thomas‘ paradoxical doctrine about the ―natural desire for the beatific vision.‖ For no concept, 
only God known in Himself, can satisfy the soul‘s innate longing for the truth‖ (cf. Dulles, The Assurance 
of Things Hoped For, 111. ―For Rousselot the light of faith is something by which we see, not something 
seen.‖)  
84
 Rousselot, The Eyes of Faith: With Rousselot's Answer to Two Attacks, 17. ―Rousselot conceived 
knowledge as a tendency towards its goal and effectively rendered man connatural with that goal, 
specifically the First Truth, God Himself, and with all that led to this goal.‖ 
85
 II.II.2.3 Reply Ob.2 ―anyone, through the light of faith divinely infused, gives assent to what is of faith 
and not the opposite.‖ Obrien, St Thomas Aquinas – Summa Theologiae Vol.31, 75. 
86
 Edith Stein, Finite and Eternal Being: An Attempt at an Assent to the Meaning of Being (Washington 
DC: ICS Publications, 2002), 21 in Prudence Allen, Mary and the Vocation of Philosophers, 52. 
87
 Introductio ad theologiam, Bk. II sec. 3; PL 178:1051 ―primordia fidei‖ in Dulles, The Assurance of 
Things Hoped For, 29. 
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created nature.
88
 According to Scotus, our search for God and faith in Him is not 
something artificially imposed on us via an external faith but a natural end of our 
created being.  
 
Jacobus Payva d‘Andrada, a Portuguese Jesuit, proposed a kind of ‗salvation of the 
Greeks‘, the idea that Aristotle is in heaven by virtue of his‗natural faith‘ and implicit 
desire for union with the one God. Responding to suggestions that anyone who never 
knew Christ would be consigned to hell, he wrote ―There can be no more shocking 
harshness and cruelty than to deliver up human beings to everlasting torments on 
account of lack of faith which they could in no way obtain.‖89 Juan De Lugo (1583-
1660) and others argued more carefully, suggesting that a pagan might come to receive 
supernatural grace which allows them to assent to certain parts of the truth (available to 
them in their pagan religion or in nature) but that they would still need to make an ‗act 
of faith‘ in a saving God.90  
 
Although Friedrich D.E. Schleiermacher (1768-1834) and his intellectual followers tend 
to fall more into Dulles‘s affective/experiential model than the transcendental model, his 
insistence that dependence on the transcendent is more significant than revealed 
propositions could be seen as a key building block for those who later developed the 
transcendental model of faith as Dulles describes it. Schleiermacher described faith as 
                                                 
88
 Cross, Great Medieval Thinkers: Duns Scotus, 11. ―Scotus‘ answer to the first question [Do we need 
revealed doctrine in order to be saved?] is a resounding ―No.‖ He reasons that it would be possible for 
God to save someone without the gift of faith, and a fortiori without any theological knowledge.‖ cf. 
Dulles, The Assurance of Things Hoped For, 36-37. 
89
 Dulles, The Assurance of Things Hoped For, 59 citing d‘Andrada‘s Orthodoxarum explicationum ... 
libri decem from Martin Chemnitz‘s Examination of the Council of Trent, Sixth Topic, sec. 1, no. 7; 
1:393. 
90
 Dulles, The Assurance of Things Hoped For, 60. 
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―the consciousness of being absolutely dependent, or, which is the same thing, of being 
in relation with God.‖91 For Schleiermacher, faith consists of the experience itself, and 
this experience becomes a testimony when shared.
92
  
 
Drawing on many of the themes above, Karl Rahner (1904-1984) interpreted the ‗light 
of faith‘ not so much as revelation of dogmatic truth,93 but as God‘s gracious gift of 
himself,
94
 which invites and enables human beings to say ―yes‖ to the transcendent 
which is called ‗God‘.95 Human faith is, in turn, a complete self giving over to the 
transcendent mystery which we call ‗God‘, following the example of Christ himself who 
gave himself over to God completely. Faith, in this model, does not mean Jesus, or 
anyone else, believes in statements of fact, but that the entire self is given over to the 
transcendent.
96
 This intimacy with the divine person does not, according to Rahner, 
lessen the mystery of God. In fact human language struggles to express the mystery of 
                                                 
91
 H. R. Mackintosh & J. S. Stewart Eds. Friedrich D.E. Schleiermacher: The Christian Faith (London, 
T&T Clark, 1948), 16. ―The self-identical essence of piety, is this : the consciousness of being absolutely 
dependent, or, which is the same thing, of being in relation with God.‖ 
92
 Mackintosh & Stewart Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, 11. ―Piety in its diverse expressions 
remains essentially a state of feeling.‖ And p12 ―The self-identical essence of piety, is this : the 
consciousness of being absolutely dependent, or, which is the same thing, of being in relation with God.‖ 
93
 Karl Rahner, Foundations of Christian Faith (New York: Crossroad, 2004), 116. ―We want to avoid 
both misunderstandings that a mere word about God, although perhaps spoken by God, as well as that of 
self-communication of God which is refined and understood entirely after the manner of a thing.‖  
94
 Rahner, Foundations of Christian Faith, 118. ―God‘s self-communication means, therefore, that what 
is communicated is really God in his own being, and in this way it is a communication for the sake of 
knowing and possessing God in immediate vision and love.‖  
95
 Rahner, Foundations of Christian Faith, 101. Rahner believes we are also free to say no to God, but 
that this ―no‖ must be to God himself, ―not merely to some distorted or childish notion of God‖ nor to 
God‘s law, nor ―merely the moral sum which we calculate from good or evil deeds.‖ For Rahner‘s 
discussion of the freedom of this choice see Rahner, Foundations of Christian Faith, 97-106. 
96
 John J O‘Donnell SJ., Karl Rahner - Life in the Spirit (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 2004), 53. 
―In Rahner‘s mind Christ‘s surrender to God in freedom reveals him as a man of faith and hope. For 
Rahner, Christ is not dispensed from faith, rather he is the perfect exemplification of it. But faith here is 
understood not so much as believing that something is the case, but rather as surrender to God. And 
Christ, like us, does so in darkness, indeed even the bitter darkness of the abandonment of the cross.‖ 
[expounding Theological Investigations XIII (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1984), 165]. 
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God.
97
 This transcendent God is the ultimate goal towards whom the human spirit is 
oriented, the only goal that can satisfy us and complete us.
98
 God commits himself to 
grant the necessary grace to enable us to rise to the goal.
99
 God‘s offer of this grace is, at 
least implicitly, in the created world, and created beings.
100
  
 
This transcendental faith is possible, according to Rahner, without explicitly assenting to 
dogmatic formulas regarding Christ.
101
 A basic acceptance of the holy mystery is 
enough for faith, even without any understanding or formulation of doctrine or even, in 
some cases, in the absence of what might be considered vital doctrines. 
102
 This form of 
‗faith‘ produces the possibility of an ‗anonymous Christian‘.103 For Rahner, ―faith is an 
                                                 
97
 Stephen Duffy, ―Experience of grace‖ in The Cambridge Companion to Karl Rahner ed. Declan 
Marmion & Mary E. Hines (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 44. ―Divine closeness 
notwithstanding, God remains the incomprehensible mystery that brings language to breaking point.‖  
98
 Rahner, Foundations of Christian Faith, 83. ―The most radial and absolutely immediate self-
communication of God in his very own being is given to us, ... the finite subject does not disappear in this 
most immediate manifestation of God and it is not suppressed, but rather it reaches its fulfilment and 
hence its fullest autonomy as subject. This autonomy is at once both the presupposition and the 
consequence of this absolute immediacy to God and from God.‖ 
99
 Stephen Duffy, ―Experience of grace‖ in The Cambridge Companion to Karl Rahner ed. Declan 
Marmion & Mary E. Hines (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 44. ―Grace is God‘s 
transforming presence enabling divinization of humans and their participation in the divine life.‖ 
100
 Stephen Duffy, ―Experience of grace‖ in The Cambridge Companion to Karl Rahner ed. Declan 
Marmion & Mary E. Hines (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 45. ―For Rahner, grace and 
nature, the divine self-gift and humans and their world, are related as the contingently-is and the 
hypothetically-necessary. Nature must be if divine self-giving is to have an addressee. Creation is 
grounded in God‘s gracing love. Nature exists for grace, never apart from grace. The incarnation is the 
goal of creation‘s movement, the conditions of its possibility.‖ 
101
 Rahner, Foundations of Christian Faith, 227. ―We can say then: anyone who accepts Jesus as the 
ultimate truth of his life and professes that God has spoken the ultimate word to him in Jesus and in his 
death, not all the penultimate words which we still have to find ourselves in our own history, but the 
ultimate word for which he lives and dies, he thereby accepts Jesus as the Son of God as the church 
professes him to be. This is true whatever the theoretically inadequate or even false conceptualisation 
might sound like in his own formulation of the faith in which he is living out his existence.‖ 
102
 Rahner, Foundations of Christian Faith, 228. ―Anyone who, though still far from any revelation 
explicitly formulated in words, accepts his existence in patient silence (or, better, in faith, hope and love), 
accepts it as the mystery which lies hidden in the mystery of eternal love and which bears life in the womb 
of death, is saying ―yes‖ to Christ even though he does not know it.‖  
103
 cf. Donovan, Daniel, ―Revelation and faith‖ in The Cambridge Companion to Karl Rahner ed. Declan 
Marmion & Mary E. Hines (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 93-94. 
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acceptance of the nearness of God as absolute mystery.‖104 Faith can even exist in 
atheists who ―accept themselves unconditionally.‖105 This faith does incline one to 
assent to revelation when it is credibly proclaimed, but can exist in persons even if they 
have never previously encountered any specific revelation.  
 
Preliminary thoughts on the Transcendental Model 
This model seems once again to possess an optimism about reason, albeit reason assisted 
and mediated by divine grace. It also focuses the search for truth and meaning firmly on 
the transcendent divine. While naming the transcendent truth as its object, however, the 
model seems to allow the possibility of an imprecise and unguided search for truth, even 
if it does not adopt it completely. Perhaps the model finds support in the dichotomy, 
such as presented by Marilyn McCord Adams, between a realism concerning reality but 
not concerning epistemology.
106
 The transcendental model seems to be promoting a 
search for truth which is optimistic about finding truth and yet pessimistic about being 
certain when one has found the truth. A proponent of this model sets out with all the joy 
of a child on an Easter egg hunt but with no idea how to tell the eggs from rocks, or 
                                                 
104
 Karl Rahner, ―Thoughts on the Possibility of Belief Today,‖ Theological Investigations, vol5 (New 
York: Crossroad, 1974), 7 in Dulles, The Assurance of Things Hoped For, 173. 
105
 Donovan, ―Revelation and faith‖ in Marmion & Hines, Eds. The Cambridge Companion to Karl 
Rahner, 94. ―On a number of occasions Rahner argued that a genuine acceptance of oneself is the 
beginning of faith, and it is already an act of saving faith. What is at stake here is not the relatively 
superficial self-acceptance of pop-psychology, but rather something that involves the whole person, 
including one‘s openness to the infinite and the absolute.‖ cf. Karl Rahner, ―Faith Between Rationality 
and Emotion,‖ Theological Investigations, vol.16 (New York: Seabury/Crossroad, 1979),67. ―[Faith] can 
be found in people who consciously believe they are and must be atheists, as long as they are completely 
obedient to the absolute demands of conscience, that is, ... they accept themselves unconditionally, 
without self rejection, fulfilling that primordial capacity of freedom which involves the subject as a 
whole.‖ Cited in Dulles, The Assurance of Things Hoped For, 173; on self acceptance as faith see 
―Anonymous Christians,‖ Theological Investigations vi, 390-398 and ―Anonymous and Explicit Faith,‖ 
Theological Investigations xvi, 52-59. 
106
 Hilary Martin OP, ―Comments on ‗Sceptical Realism: Faith and Reason in Collaboration‘‖ in Fisher & 
Ramsay, Faith and Reason – Friends or Foes in the New Millennium?, 21. ―While Adams is a realist 
about reality, she is not a realist about human knowledge of that reality.‖ 
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even, ultimately, if eggs are what he is looking for! Epistemological pessimism 
notwithstanding, the absence of an emphasis on dogmatic guidelines leaves the 
proponent of this model with reason alone to identify, discern, and critically assess the 
raw data of experience in order to determine what, if anything, has transcendent 
significance. In other words the proponent of the transcendental model is left with only 
their reason to guide their life and belief.  
 
Although this model seems to downplay specific revealed truth, it does not dispense 
with reason. Where specific revelation is absent, or not yet presented ‗credibly,‘ the 
individual has only reason to guide them in discerning a ‗transcendent‘ reality from 
random happenstance. Reason has a place in organising these ideas into a coherent 
system which expresses their underlying desire to draw near to the mysterious God and 
serves as a guide their daily actions. Hence Gregory Moses can propose that we cannot 
insist others believe what we do, since what we believe is only our explanation of what 
we believe at present, but we can expect their proposals to be reasonable. Their 
conscience almost completely guided by reason, (guided by the ‗light of faith‘), 
becomes the norm for their belief and ‗faithfulness‘ of life.107  
 
The scope of reason within this model might include the exercise of discerning who ―I‖ 
am in order to engage in the fundamental self acceptance, the act of will which engages 
my whole person in a fundamental ‗yes‘ to the transcendent, and the practical operation 
of the conscience which is the arbiter of all moral action. In this light it would seem that 
                                                 
107
 Gregory Moses, ―Faith and Reason – Naturalised and Naturalised‖ in Fisher & Ramsay, Faith and 
Reason – Friends or Foes in the New Millennium?, 49-52.  
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the transcendental model presents an optimistic approach to reason, trusting it 
completely. Nevertheless it seems to sacrifice hope in universally accessible objective 
truth via revelation in favour of a disproportionate trust in unguided reason, as opposed 
to reason assisted by faith and revealed truth. At the very least it moves the focus from 
revelation (as it appears in the propositional model) and focuses on the subjective fides 
qua aspect of faith. 
 
Even so, the claim that human beings find fulfilment in belief is an audacious claim, 
made in the face of modern scepticism and even surprises some self professed realists. 
Marilyn McCord Adams believes, for example, that Pope John Paul II goes beyond St 
Thomas, even beyond Kant‘s ―moral‖ imperative to claim that God and belief in our 
immortality are necessary for a successful search for the meaning of life.
108
  
 
The Transcendental Model in Fides et Ratio 
Positive 
Fides et Ratio espouses the foundational principle of the transcendental model of faith 
by asserting that faith and reason not only work in cooperation towards the same 
ultimate truth
109
 but that this search begins in the very nature of humankind, knowing 
ourselves in all the mystery that entails, and asking the ―fundamental questions which 
pervade human life: Who am I, where have I come from and where am I going? Why is 
                                                 
108
 Marilyn McCord Adams, ―Sceptical Realism: Faith and Reason in Collaboration‖ in, Fisher & 
Ramsay, Faith and Reason – Friends or Foes in the New Millennium?, 11. 
109
 F&R, introductory paragraph. 
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there evil? What is there after this life?”110 These things stem from our common 
experience of being human, and the quest for meaning that this entails.  
 
Fides et Ratio uses the ‗wise man‘ of Scripture as the exemplar of man in pursuit of his 
own self realisation. Citing the dramatic poetic description of a wise man pursuing 
wisdom as a hunter pursues his prey,
111
 the encyclical lauds the search for truth as 
something which defines our very humanity, and sets us apart as creatures destined for 
transcendence. Self realisation is the ultimate goal of all human beings in this model.
112
 
Indeed, the very search for truth implies an inbuilt conviction that truth is obtainable.
113
 
This is not to say that we can achieve complete knowledge and salvific self realisation 
by purely natural powers. The Holy Spirit provides an utterly transformed way of 
looking at the universe and oneself which allows the intellect to rise to the 
contemplation of truth
114
. It is the Holy Spirit at work in all of history, from beginning 
to end, that man‘s illuminated reason discovers, discerns and assents to in faith.115 The 
truth is available to all in history and ultimately leads anyone with a ―sincere heart‖ to 
the ―definitive vision of God.‖116  
 
                                                 
110
 F&R, 1, and 26. ―Truth comes initially ... as a question: Does life have meaning?‖ 
111
 F&R, 16. “Happy the man who meditates on wisdom and reasons intelligently, who reflects in his heart 
on her ways and ponders her secrets. He pursues her like a hunter and lies in wait on her paths. He peers 
through her windows and listens at her doors.” (Sir 14:20ff).” 
112
 F&R, 4. ―Driven by the desire to discover the ultimate truth of existence, human beings seek to acquire 
those universal elements of knowledge which enable them to understand themselves better and to advance 
in their own self-realization.‖ 
113
 F&R, 29. ―Human beings would not even begin to search for something of which they knew nothing or 
for something which they thought was wholly beyond them.” 
114
 F&R, 16. ―Faith sharpens the inner eye, opening the mind to discover in the flux of events the 
workings of Providence.‖ Also relevant are F&R, 41 ―purified and rightly tuned, therefore, reason could 
rise to the higher planes of thought‖ and F&R, 43. ―Illuminated by faith, reason is set free... to rise to the 
knowledge of the Triune God.‖ 
115
 F&R, 11. Citing Dei Verbum, 8. 
116
 F&R, 15. 
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The Thomistic theme of connaturality referred to in Fides et Ratio
117
 also seems to 
support the transcendental model. The light of faith which opens our senses and minds 
to the truth of God in history, creation and in our very selves goes further to instil in us a 
kind of natural inclination to the truth of God, by virtue of his gracious work of faith 
within us. This connaturality seems to be manifest in the encyclical‟s example of the 
martyrs. The martyrs‟ witness does not need logical arguments or carefully worded 
propositions in order to convince us of the truth their actions bear testimony to since, 
“from the moment they speak to us of what we perceive deep down as the truth we have 
sought for so long.”118 
 
The focus here is the human being on the path to enlightenment rather than dogmatic 
propositions. To propose dogmatic formulae in themselves as the ‗end‘ or object of faith 
distracts from the purpose of revelation since, ―the knowledge proper to faith does not 
destroy the mystery; it only reveals it the more.”119 Far from ending the search, 
revelation, wherever we find it, urges us to search further because “this knowledge 
refers back constantly to the mystery of God which the human mind cannot exhaust but 
can only receive and embrace in faith.”120 
 
                                                 
117
 F&R, 44. ―This wisdom comes to know by way of connaturality.‖ 
118
 F&R, 32. Further ―the martyrs stir in us a profound trust because they give voice to what we already 
feel and they declare what we would like to have the strength to express.‖ 
119
 F&R, 13. 
120
 F&R, 15. ―Revelation therefore introduces into our history a universal and ultimate truth which stirs 
the human mind to ceaseless effort; indeed, it impels reason continually to extend the range of its 
knowledge‖ Also relevant is F&R, 38 ―philosophy yearns for the wisdom ... and does all it can to acquire 
it.‖  
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Fides et Ratio seems to support this model in its repeated insistence that “human 
knowledge is a journey which allows no rest,”121 urging man on to greater effort to 
discover and comprehend it, in fundamental openness to the transcendent God who 
“neither deceives nor wishes to deceive.”122 Since the truth is found in the origin of all 
truth, it is the primary task of human beings to search for truth, and thus for God.
 123
 It is 
not only revelation itself that spurs us on to discover truth: it is our deepest human desire 
to know the truth and embrace it as our own.
124
 The encyclical echoes the proponents of 
a transcendental model of faith in insisting that all knowledge, and even the search for it, 
leads us ultimately to the one who is the Truth, the Word made flesh.  
 
Even the concept of an “anonymous Christian”, if seen as a genuine seeker of truth, 
seems to find support in the idea that there are many paths to truth but only one final 
goal, Jesus Christ.
125
 It might receive a certain qualified support from the closing 
paragraphs where the author declares the Church‟s commitment to genuine dialogue in 
truth with all who love the truth excluding neither those who are ignorant of the ultimate 
source of truth nor even those who “are hostile to the Church and persecute her in 
various ways”.126  
 
                                                 
121
 F&R, 16, 17, 18, 33. 
122
 F&R, 8. 
123
 F&R, 17. ―In God there lies the origin of all things, in him is found the fullness of the mystery, and in 
this his glory consists; to men and women there falls the task of exploring truth with their reason, and in 
this their nobility consists.” 
124
 F&R, 24. ―In the far reaches of the human heart there is a seed of desire and nostalgia for God.‖, 25 
―all human beings desire to know.‖  
125
 F&R, 38. ―There are many paths which lead to truth, but since Christian truth has a salvific value, any 
one of these paths may be taken, as long as it leads to the final goal, that is to the Revelation of Jesus 
Christ”; (Also relevant is 102 ―People today will come to realize that their humanity is all the more 
affirmed the more they entrust themselves to the Gospel and open themselves to Christ‖). 
126
 F&R, 104 (citing Gaudium et Spes, 92). 
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Fides et Ratio shares the transcendentalist‟s optimism regarding reason. Where the 
encyclical acknowledges that reason can mislead it attributes the error to human sin
127
, 
an improperly attuned will,
128
 rather than to reason. Even admitting that reason is 
“limited” the encyclical insists it is possible to know truth by reason.129  
 
Rahner‟s primacy of conscience, essential to a model of faith which plays down the 
necessity of authoritative revelation, might perhaps find support in the admonition to 
greater use of conscience.
130
  
 
It is hardly surprising that this shared optimism regarding reason leads to further 
agreement in the conclusion that all people should be encouraged to trust and exercise 
reason in their ongoing search for truth.
131
  
 
Negative 
While Fides et Ratio does assert that God has placed his truth “in time and history”132 
the document is referring to the specific revelation of God in Jesus Christ, the incarnate 
Word and second person of the Blessed Trinity. The proponents of the transcendental 
model claim that their search for truth has Christ as its end. But, even if the individual is 
                                                 
127
 F&R, 17. ―If human beings with their intelligence fail to recognize God as Creator of all, it is not 
because they lack the means to do so, but because their free will and their sinfulness place an impediment 
in the way.” 
128
 F&R, 28. ―The natural limitation of reason and the inconstancy of the heart often obscure and distort a 
person's search.” 
129
 F&R, 16. ―With the light of reason human beings can know which path to take, but they can follow 
that path to its end, quickly and unhindered, only if with a rightly tuned spirit they search for it.” 
130
 F&R, 68. ―In order to apply these to the particular circumstances of individual and communal life, 
Christians must be able fully to engage their conscience and the power of their reason.” 
131
 F&R, 56. ―Nonetheless, in the light of faith which finds in Jesus Christ this ultimate meaning, I cannot 
but encourage philosophers—be they Christian or not—to trust in the power of human reason.” 
132
 F&R, 11. 
8 July 2010 Page 31 
not aware of this at stages of the journey, the specific rejection of dogmatic formulae 
seems to be what Fides et Ratio warns against in several places.
133
 We are further 
warned of the disastrous results of any attempt to seek the truth that divorces us from the 
sure guiding hand of God‟s self revelation.134 As the encyclical says, our inner conflicts, 
concerns and fear of where the truth may lead us can distort our perception of truth.
135
 
In addition to general natural failings of human reason, there is a constant danger 
specific to each culture and age which has the potential to lead us astray
136
. This is why 
Fides et Ratio urges us, with the words of Saint Paul to “See to it that no-one takes you 
captive through philosophy and empty deceit, according to human tradition ... and not 
according to Christ.”137 The encyclical also provides examples of the early Fathers 
struggling against the prevailing errors of their day by clinging to the revealed truth.
138
  
 
Thus Fides et Ratio urges theologians to remain firmly within their ―ecclesial 
context‖139 and submit themselves to the guidance of the Magisterium which responds 
with warnings to those who stray from the path to genuine wisdom.
140
 
 
                                                 
133
 F&R, 48. ―Deprived of what Revelation offers, reason has taken side-tracks which expose it to the 
danger of losing sight of its final goal.” Also relevant are F&R, 2, 5, 6, 8, 12 and 37. 
134
 F&R, 5. ―sundered from that truth, individuals are at the mercy of caprice.‖, 6, 21, and 75 ―In refusing 
the truth offered by divine Revelation, philosophy only does itself damage, since this is to preclude access 
to a deeper knowledge of truth.” 
135
 F&R, 28. ―The search for truth, of course, is not always so transparent nor does it always produce such 
results. The natural limitation of reason and the inconstancy of the heart often obscure and distort a 
person's search. Truth can also drown in a welter of other concerns. People can even run from the truth as 
soon as they glimpse it because they are afraid of its demands.” 
136
 F&R, 55. ―This happens when theologians, through lack of philosophical competence, allow 
themselves to be swayed uncritically by assertions which have become part of current parlance and 
culture but which are poorly grounded in reason.‖ 
137
 F&R, 37 (Col 2:8). 
138
 F&R, 37 (Saint Irenaeus and Tertullian). 
139
 F&R, 101. 
140
 F&R, 49. 
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Conclusion to the Transcendental Model 
The transcendental model places great importance on reason. Where reason is darkened, 
faith provides light. Where it is limited by its natural capacity it is reinvigorated by 
supernatural faith. Where supernatural matters seem so far beyond our mundane 
existence that they are unnatural to us, faith infuses us with a connaturality with the 
things of God. Where a person does not believe, or even explicitly denounces certain 
beliefs, this model places great hope in reason leading them to what is their proper 
fulfilment in the truth. In placing hope in reason, even assisted reason, to find 
transcendent meaning, the proponents of this model assume that both human beings, and 
the universe they inhabit, are fundamentally coherent, and coherently point us to truth 
that transcends this universe.   
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The Fiducial Model 
Faith, in the fiducial model, is trusting surrender to God‘s promises to save us. The 
model seems to find its beginnings in the Scriptures themselves. The Hebrew and Greek 
words translated into English as ‗faith‘ usually include the concept of trustfulness in 
their semantic fields. In the case of the Old Testament, the primary meaning of these 
words seems to be the trustworthiness of the object of faith rather than a focus on the 
belief of the subject. There is no word in Hebrew that directly corresponds to the 
modern word ―faith‖.141  
 
The Hebrew word נמא in its simplest form means to support or sustain.142 The niphal 
form, meaning ―to be established as reliable, trustworthy etc‖, is used predominantly of 
God.
143
 In the hiphil form the meaning is primarily ―to stand firm‖, or ―to trust‖ which is 
often translated ―to believe.‖144 Where the word is used of people it refers to their trust, 
or lack of trust in the faithfulness of God. Another Hebrew word often translated as 
―trust‖ is חטב. Almost all the occurrences of this word indicate surety, trust and proper 
hope in God or some other trustworthy object. Even the New Testament  should 
perhaps be translated as ―trust‖ as much as ―faith.‖145 The majority of Scriptural uses 
                                                 
141
 Dulles, The Assurance of Things Hoped For, 7. (Dulles points out that of the three Hebrew words most 
often translated to the Greek  none correspond exactly to the Greek meaning.)  
142
 William L. Holladay, Ed. A Concise Hebrew and Aramaic Lexicon of the Old Testament (Grand 
Rapids, Eerdmans, 1988), 20. This simple meaning only in its Qal passive participle form ―was 
sustained.‖ The predominant use is in the niphal and the hiphil. 
143
 Wigram The New Englishman’s Hebrew Concordance (Peabody, Hendrickson, 1984). Some 
exceptions include: Gen 42:20 where Joseph keeps one of his brothers hostage to ensure the ‗faithfulness‘ 
of the remaining brothers to their agreement. Another example is the reference to God raising up a 
‗faithful‘ priest, ‗faithful‘ being defined by the fact he ‗will do what is in [God‘s] heart and mind.‘ 
144
 Wigram The New Englishman’s Hebrew Concordance, 103-104. The semantic field of this word, as it 
is used in Scripture, includes ‗faithful/ reliable (58), believe (41), confirmed/true (23), trust (9), 
sure/assurance (8), established (8), lasting/enduring (5), nurse (5), guardian (4), firm (4), fulfilled (2), 
doorpost (1)‘, and even indicates the ‗steady hand‘ of a skilled sculptor in Song of Songs. 
145
 Walter Bauer et al, A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament, 2nd Ed, 662.  
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refer to acting with certainty that something is trustworthy and reliable, particularly God 
in fulfilling His promises. God knows best and thus we trust Him by doing as He 
commands, because we know it is good for us, even if we cannot understand why. 
 
Theologians in the fourth century, including St Augustine, responded to the Pelagian 
heresy by emphasising the fallen nature of human reason.
146
 In his early writings, 
Augustine suggests that the mind‘s vision of God is clouded by our immersion in the 
material world and confusion of the senses.
147
 In his Confessions, he speaks of certainty 
of mind but blames his own pride and sensuality as distorting factors.
148
 Later writings 
such as City of God speak of faith as a conscious choice to believe the God who 
descends into the ‗darkness‘ of the world to reveal himself as light and to rescue us.149 
According to Augustine, this darkness serves to protect us from intellectual pride, and to 
teach us to rely on God in order to know.
150
 Faith is essentially an act of obedience to 
God‘s word, both moral and intellectual. Later in life, Augustine still insists that faith is 
                                                 
146
 Dulles, The Assurance of Things Hoped For, 23. According to Dulles, Basil the Great (330-379), 
Gregory of Nazianzus (329-390) and Gregory of Nyssa (335-394) all emphasised the inability of man‘s 
reason to rise to the truth of God, and the necessity of faith in God‘s revelation to grasp the divine truth.  
147
 Dulles, The Assurance of Things Hoped For, 26.  
148
 cf. Maria Boulding Tr. The Confessions of St Augustine, 193 (Bk VIII.11). ―I had grown used to 
pretending that the only reason why I had not yet turned my back on the world to serve you was that my 
perception of the truth was uncertain, but that excuse was no longer available to me, for by now I was 
certain. But I was still entangled by the earth and refused to enlist in your service.‖ Dulles (26) claims 
Augustine places more emphasis on his own pride than on sensuality in Confessions.  
149
 Phillip Schaff, Saint Augustine’s City of God and Christian Doctrine (Kessinger, 2004). Dulles refers 
to City of God XI, 29 ―For the knowledge of the creature is, in comparison of the knowledge of the 
Creator, but a twilight; and so it dawns and breaks into morning when that creature is drawn to the praise 
and love of the Creator.‖ 
150
 Phillip Schaff, Saint Augustine’s City of God and Christian Doctrine IX, 537. ―I do not doubt that this 
[darkness] was divinely arranged for the purpose of subduing pride by toil, and preventing a feeling of 
satiety in the intellect, which generally holds in small esteem what is discovered without difficulty.‖   
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a pure gift, freely given by God. Justifying faith comes through hearing Christ and 
receiving faith through hearing the incarnate Word.
151
  
 
The fiducial model seems to find some support in the canons of the Council of Orange 
(529AD) itself a response to a development of Pelagius‘ error.152 The Council affirms 
that ―the sin of the first man has so impaired and weakened free will that no one 
thereafter can either love God as he ought or believe in God or do good for God's sake, 
unless the grace of divine mercy has preceded him.‖153 In the era of the Reformation, 
when the matter of faith and works was hotly debated, both Catholics and Protestants 
affirmed the canons of the Council of Orange regarding faith and works.
154
 
 
Where scholastics saw faith as an act of the intellect and hope as a function of the will, 
Martin Luther (1483-1546) criticised the scholastic tendency to place importance on 
reason and ‗works‘ which he called Pelagian.155 Luther referred to an ‗alien 
righteousness‘ which is imputed to us by God and which we passively receive.156 God 
creates this faith by his Word, which comes to us through proclamation and the 
administration of the sacraments. For Luther, faith and reason are in constant conflict. 
                                                 
151
 1 Cor 3:7, In Joan. Evang., 26:7 cited in Dulles, The Assurance of Things Hoped For, 27. 
152
 Kurt Aland, A History of Christianity Vol.I (Philadelphia: Fortress,1985), 210-211. ―The so-called 
Semipelagian controversy ... was fed from two sources: the ascetic and the traditionalist.‖ 
153
 John. H. Leith, Creeds of the Churches (Louisville, John Knox Press, 1982) p43. Concluding 
paragraph of the Council of Orange, 529AD (cf Dulles, The Assurance of Things Hoped For, 28). 
154
  Dulles, The Assurance of Things Hoped For, 28. ―They were accepted by Catholics and by most 
Protestants as valid and decisive.‖ 
155
 Dulles, The Assurance of Things Hoped For, 44. ―[Luther] particularly criticised what he took to be a 
Pelagian tendency in Scholasticism to attach too much importance to human reason and human works as 
approaches to faith.‖ 
156
 Robert Kolb, ―Luther on the Two Kinds of Righteousness‖ in Timothy J. Wengert, Harvesting Martin 
Luther’s reflections on theology, ethics and the church (Grand Rapids, Eerdmans, 2004), 47-48. ―There 
are two kinds of righteousness... the first is alien righteousness, that is, the righteousness of another, 
instilled from without. This is the righteousness of Christ by which he justifies through faith.‖ (citing a 
sermon given in 1519 by Martin Luther called Two kinds of Righteousness). 
8 July 2010 Page 36 
Faith endures a constant attack from experience and doubt which is only combated by 
faith firmly clinging to God and the believer submitting reason completely to faith. In 
fact he describes faith as a sacrifice of reason, saying ―for by this sacrifice they [the 
believers] slay reason which is the greatest and most invincible enemy of God.‖ 157 
 
Luther defined two types of faith. First, ‗historic‘ faith, and second, accepting what God 
says is true and trusting in God‘s promises. The latter definition is the kind of faith 
which alone justifies. This ‗faith alone‘ which saves is complete trust in God‘s promises 
in revelation.
158
 Similarly, John Calvin (1509-1564) defined faith as ―firm knowledge of 
God‘s benevolence towards us... both revealed to our minds and sealed in our hearts [by 
the Holy Spirit.]‖159 This idea of faith is summarised in the words of the (Calvinist) 
Second Helvitic Confession; 
 
What is faith? Christian faith is not an opinion or human conviction, 
but a most firm trust and clear and steadfast assent of the mind, and 
then a most certain apprehension of the truth of God presented in the 
Scriptures and in the Apostles‘ Creed, and thus also of God himself, 
the greatest good, and especially of God‘s promise and of Christ who 
is the fulfilment of all promises.
160
 
 
Although the Council of Trent specifically rejected a fiducial position,
161
 it is still 
possible to find limited support in later Catholic authors. St John of the Cross (1542-
                                                 
157
 Martin Luther, Commentary on Galatians, 1535; LW 26:229 in Dulles, The Assurance of Things 
Hoped For, 45. 
158
 Theodore G. Tappert, The Book of Concord (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1959), 366. ―To cling to him 
with all our heart is nothing else than to enstrust ourselves to him completely.‖ Also relevant are The 
Apology to the Augsburg Confession, IV, 41 (Tappert, 113) and 58 (Tappert, 115).  
159
 Dulles, The Assurance of Things Hoped For, 46.  
160
 Arthur C. Cochrane, ed.  Reformed Confession of the 16
th
 Century, (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1966), 
257 in Dulles, The Assurance of Things Hoped For, 52. 
161
 Dulles, The Assurance of Things Hoped For, 49. Although canon 5 of the Decree on Justification 
reflects the Augustinian theme that nothing happens without being moved by God‘s grace, it insists that 
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1591) for example, says faith is a means of uniting the intellect with God in this present 
life, a kind of dark, illumination
162
 which does in this life what the vision of God will do 
in the next life. In fact, he suggests that as our faith grows it must learn to dispense with 
sensory and intellectual evidence. He proposes that faith nullifies the light of the 
intellect.
163
 After something of a conversion experience, the brilliant Blaise Pascal 
(1623-1662) literally sewed words into his clothing that God is ―not [the God] of 
philosophers and scientists‖ but rather of ―certitude, feeling, joy and peace.‖ Faith, says 
Pascal rests on total submission to God‘s authority.164  
 
Over a century later, the Danish Protestant, Soren Kierkegaard (1813-1855) insisted that 
faith was an ―absolute paradox‖ offensive to reason.165 He argued that faith regards 
proof as its enemy, seeking no assurance other than itself.
166
 He nonetheless confesses a 
kind of ‗demented‘ admiration for the incomprehensible faith of Abraham.167 Wilhelm 
                                                                                                                                               
we freely cooperate with grace. Canon six incorporates a Scotist theme that faith is one of a number of 
preparatory acts, and that faith is ―assent to the truth of the proclaimed message‖. Faith comes from 
hearing, we are led (freely) toward God. We fear hell, love God, hate sin, hope in God, are baptised etc. 
162
 Kieran Kavanaugh OCD & Otilio Rodriguez OCD Trs. The Collected Works of St John of the Cross 
(Washington: ICS, 1979), 111. ―Faith, a dark and obscure cloud to man (also a night in that it blinds and 
deprives him of his natural light), illumines and pours light into the darkness of his soul by means of its 
own darkness.‖ (Ascent of Mount Carmel Bk II, 3,4).  
163
 Kavanaugh & Rodriguez Trs. The Collected Works of St John of the Cross, 118. ―For other knowledge 
can be acquired by the light, if that light of the understanding, but the knowledge that is of faith is 
acquired without the illumination of the understanding, which is rejected for faith.‖ (Bk II, 3).  
164
 Dulles, The Assurance of Things Hoped For, 63. See also Simon Blackburn, Oxford Dictionary of 
Philosophy (Chatham: Oxford University Press, 1996), 278 ―Because of his prevailing scepticism, 
coupled, however, with a deep faith, Pascal has been compared to Kierkegaard as a leading example of 
religious conviction based on an existential commitment to faith rather than on reason.‖ 
165
 Soren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1983), 48. ―Faith 
is this paradox, that the single individual as the particular stands in absolute relation to the absolute. This 
standpoint cannot be mediated, for all mediation occurs precisely by virtue of the universal; it is and 
forever remains a paradox, inaccessible to thought.‖ 
166
 Dulles, The Assurance of Things Hoped For, 80; He rejected the theories of Hegel and the (then) rigid 
Danish Lutheran Church cf. Blackburn, Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, 207. 
167
 Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, 53. ―Abraham is ... either a murderer or a believer. Abraham lacks 
the middle term that saves the tragic hero. That is why I can understand a tragic hero but I cannot 
understand Abraham, even though in a certain demented sense I admire him more than all the others.‖ 
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Herrmann (1846-1922) denounced Catholicism and even the remnants of it in Luther‘s 
theology, saying that doctrine is only useful as a preamble to faith as a ―trustful 
surrender.‖168  
 
Some Protestant scholars returned to a form of the fiducial model in a theory first 
espoused by Jürgen Moltmann (1926-   ) in Theology of Hope in 1967 and emerging 
from a dialogue with a Marxist philosopher Ernst Bloch. Moltmann returned to Calvin‘s 
idea that hope is inseparable from faith.
169
 Wolfhart Pannenberg (1928-   ) suggests that 
the record of God‘s action in history reveals God as faith-worthy, but faith is the 
surrender of oneself into this same God. He says certainty of faith comes when the 
message of God is ―grasped completely.‖170 Moltmann disagreed that history provides a 
reliable foundation but agreed that ―faith is called to life by God‘s promise and we hope 
in the God who cannot and will not lie.‖171 Moltmann also maintains that this hope does 
not preclude thinking. In fact, he says, it is hope that enables and empowers our 
thinking.
172
  
                                                 
168
 Willhelm Herrmann, The Communion of the Christian with God (New York, Williams and Norgate, 
1906), 40. ―By this breach from scholasticism, we gain for theology the opposite result from that which 
our breaking loose from mysticism brings about for the inner life of the Christian. There is less theology; 
there is a richer life within. Our rejection of the practice of Roman Catholicism suggests the true course 
for the accomplishment of our task. Our object is to set forth the real communion of the Christian with 
God.‖ Cf Dulles, The Assurance of Things Hoped For, 97. 
169
 Dulles, The Assurance of Things Hoped For, 161 Citing Jurgen Moltmann, Theologie der Hoffnung, 5
th
 
ed. (1965; ET, Theology of Hope, London: SCM, 1967). ―Faith hopes in order to know what it believes. 
Hence all its knowledge will be anticipatory, fragmentary knowledge forming a prelude to a promised 
future.‖ 
170
 Wolfhart Pannenberg, Jesus, God and Man 2
nd
 Edition (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1977), 229. 
―Where the message of God‘s nearness is grasped completely and in full trust, salvation itself is already 
effective.‖ cf. Dulles, The Assurance of Things Hoped For, 175. ―The certainty of faith consists in the 
completeness of trust.‖ Citing Pannenberg in ―Response to the Discussion‖ in James Robinson, & John 
Cobb eds., Theology as History (New York: Harper Row, 1967), 273. 
171
 Jürgen Moltmann, Theologie der Hoffnung, 5
th
 Ed. (1965; ET, Theology of Hope, London: SCM, 
1967), 44. 
172
 Moltmann, Theologie der Hoffnung, 18 ―If it is hope that maintains and upholds faith and keeps it 
moving on, if it is hope that draws the believer into the life of love, then it will also be hope that is the 
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Also, on the fiducial paradigm, August Sabatier (1839-1901) supported a ―symbol-
fideism.‖ That is, symbols lead us to the truth but true faith is a deep inner conviction. 
Faith is seen as a moral act, a consecration of the self to God, as opposed to a merely 
intellectual assent to historical or revealed truths.
173
  They expressed their justification 
formula as ―we are saved by faith, independent of beliefs.‖174  
 
Preliminary Thoughts on the Fiducial Model 
The fiducial model seems to present an extremely pessimistic view of reason, 
discounting it as a reliable source of truth, discovering truth or even of properly 
interpreting truth. This epistemic pessimism is evident in Marilyn McCord Adams‘ 
commentary on Fides et Ratio. She acknowledges that while the Holy Spirit affects our 
search,
 175
 it does not guarantee certainty.
176
 In his critique of Adams, Hillary Martin 
admits that even great thinkers such as Anselm and Aquinas acknowledge that we 
understand reality ―rather weakly and in the diluted manner.‖177 Epistemic uncertainty 
                                                                                                                                               
mobilizing and driving force of faith‘s thinking, of its knowledge of, and reflections on, human nature, 
history and society.‖ 
173
 August Sabatier, & Jean Reville, Religions of authority and the religion of the spirit (BiblioLife, 2009), 
335. ―I have carefully distinguished between faith and belief, reserving the first expression for that act of 
heart and will – an essentially moral act – whereby man accepts the gift of God and his forgiveness, and 
consecrates himself to him; applying the second to that intellectual act by which the mind gives its 
consent to a historic fact and to a doctrine.‖ 
174
 Sabatier & Reville, Religions of authority and the religion of the spirit, 335. 
175
 Marilyn McCord Adams, ―Sceptical realism: Faith and Reason in Collaboration‖ in Anthony Fisher & 
Hayden Ramsay, Faith and Reason – Friends or Foes in the New Millennium? (Adelaide, ATF Press, 
2004), 17. ―The Spirit surrounds, enfolds, nudges, tries to pull into focus, as St Paul says, ―with sighs too 
deep for words.‖ 
176
 See Hillary Martin OP, ―Comments on ‗Sceptical realism: Faith and Reason in Collaboration‘‖ in 
Anthony Fisher & Hayden Ramsay Faith and Reason – Friends or Foes in the New Millennium? 
(Adelaide, ATF Press, 2004), 21. ―While Adams is a realist about reality, she is not a realist about human 
knowledge of that reality.‖ 
177
 Hillary Martin OP ―Comments on ‗Sceptical realism: Faith and Reason in Collaboration‘‖ in Anthony 
Fisher & Hayden Ramsay Faith and Reason – Friends or Foes in the New Millennium? (Adelaide, ATF 
Press, 2004), 21. 
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notwithstanding, Adams is not prepared to abandon reason as some more vigorous 
proponents of the fiducial model advocate.
178
 In the face of epistemic uncertainty, most 
proponents of the fiducial model propose the complete submission of will to objective 
truth revealed by God, specifically to his promise of salvation. As we have seen, some 
even denounce reason in their attempt to elevate faith. 
 
Nevertheless, engaging in a submission of reason involves reason itself, moved by the 
will. Thus this view is not a complete rejection of reason even if it seems to allocate to 
reason a different role. At the very least, reason must be employed to discern what is 
received and trusted as revelation. Reason must then engage revelation in order to 
comprehend what form surrender to God would take in our own life. And reason must 
be engaged in the ongoing application and assessment of our application of these 
determined principles. Without reason we would be unable to distinguish true 
inspirations of the Holy Spirit from delusions. Finally, even if this model of faith were 
reduced to a single self determining act such as a ‗decision for Jesus‘ this would still be 
an act of the mind which, as an act of surrender of the whole person, involves all 
faculties of the person, including the intellect. Reason must be surrendered to God. 
Despite some protestations of its proponents, this does not seem to be a rejection of the 
use of reason but of reason as a source of surety in itself.  
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 Marilyn McCord Adams, ―Sceptical realism: Faith and Reason in Collaboration‖ in Anthony Fisher & 
Hayden Ramsay Faith and Reason – Friends or Foes in the New Millennium? (Adelaide, ATF Press, 
2004), 10. ―In philosophy, anti-realism strikes me as a bad bargain, ... it pays the exorbitant price of 
admitting that the Truth we wanted to reach is not even there.‖   
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It may be possible to apply one of Friedrich Nietzsche‘s critiques of Christianity, in a 
rather more specific sense, in the case of this model of faith. Nietzsche wrote that, worse 
than merely being too weak to ascend to greatness, Christian piety turns this weakness 
into a virtue.
179
 Nietzsche denounces this ―cunning of impotence‖ as profoundly 
dishonest and unhelpful if we are to acknowledge reality and strive to reach our 
potential. Perhaps we could argue that, while acknowledging the pitfalls of human 
reason, it would be unhelpful to allow this weakness to be ‗lied‘ into something 
meritorious rather than healed, nurtured and urged into something genuinely 
meritorious, the search for truth. 
 
The Fiducial Model in Fides et Ratio 
Positive 
Even while expounding the compatibility of faith and reason, Fides et Ratio still warns 
against uncritical reliance on philosophy in our search for truth. It points out that 
philosophy has fallen into grave error in the past, especially so in recent times,
180
 and 
that these errors have cast doubt onto the ―pure and simple faith‖ of the People of God. 
It sees the duty of the Church‘s Magisterium as warning against any of these 
philosophies which contradict revealed truth.
181
 Even in the opening paragraphs the 
document emphasises the unreliability of human reason, citing 1 Cor 13:12 to suggest 
that we cling now to revealed truth because in the present life we will only ever ―see in a 
                                                 
179
 Winifred Wing Han Lamb, ―‘Truth in the Inward Part‘: Faith and the Scalpel of Suspicion‖ in Anthony 
Fisher & Hayden Ramsay Faith and Reason – Friends or Foes in the New Millennium? (Adelaide, ATF 
Press, 2004), 81.  
180
 F&R, 49. 
181
 F&R, 50. 
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mirror dimly‖.182 This model‘s pessimistic view of reason might seem to have some 
support in Fides et Ratio‘s complaint that reason sundered from truth has ―lost the 
capacity to lift its gaze to the heights, not daring to rise to the truth of being.‖183  
 
Fides et Ratio observes that human reason is not only compromised by an overload of 
data from experience
184
 but it might be said to be fundamentally flawed in itself. 
Original sin, described as the primal disobedience, has “so wounded reason” that human 
ability to know the truth has been “impaired” by its rejection of God, the source of 
truth.
185
 Trapped by the devastating results of original sin, reason becomes “a prisoner to 
itself”186 and this “inconsistency of the heart” often obscures and distorts our view.187 
The effect of sin does not end with distortion of the truth. Even when people are able to 
hear some of the demands of truth they “run from the truth as soon as they glimpse it 
because they are afraid of its demands.”188 
 
Philosophy, as a product of this fallen reason, has throughout history fallen into error, 
especially in recent times.
189
 According to Fides et Ratio, certainty of truth cannot be 
attributed solely to human reason but is a gift from God.
190
 Even this revelation itself is 
                                                 
182
 F&R, 2. 
183
 F&R, 5. 
184
 F&R, 5. ―Reason ... has wilted under the weight of so much knowledge.” And 28 “Truth can also 
drown in a welter of other concerns.” 
185
 F&R, 22. And 51. ―Human reason [is] wounded and weakened by sin.” And 75 “[Philosophy is] 
seriously handicapped by the inherent weakness of human reason.” 
186
 F&R, 22. 
187
 F&R, 28. 
188
 F&R, 28. 
189
 F&R, 49.  
190
 F&R, 15. ―The truth made known to us by Revelation is neither the product nor the consummation of 
an argument devised by human reason. It appears instead as something gratuitous.” 
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―always fragmentary and impaired by the limits of our understanding”191 so that it is 
only possible to understand through the gift of faith.
192
 Echoing the First Vatican 
Council, Fides et Ratio asserts that there is a knowledge ―peculiar to faith‖ which 
surpasses human reason. This knowledge is obtained from the ―most certain truth‖, God 
himself.
193
 Without revelation this truth cannot be known with certainty.
194
 So the 
human person assents to the truth revealed by God on the basis of God‘s guarantee of 
truthfulness.
195
 Even further, Fides et Ratio seems to support the primacy of faith 
asserted by Fideism when it says that we ―can accomplish no more important act in our 
lives than the act of faith.‖196 Even in moral matters man seems unable to determine 
what is good and evil without reference to the highest truth.
197
  
 
Negative 
It may seem that Fides et Ratio at least implicitly supports fideism, but the selected texts 
above are undone by examination in context and overwhelmed by counterclaims and 
clear denunciations of fideism later in the encyclical.  
 
                                                 
191
 F&R, 13. Also relevant are F&R, 9 “There are proposed for our belief mysteries hidden in God which, 
unless they are divinely revealed, cannot be known” and F&R, 23 “It is here that every attempt to reduce 
the Father's saving plan to purely human logic is doomed to failure.” 
192
 F&R, 13. ―Faith alone makes it possible to penetrate the mystery in a way that allows us to understand 
it coherently.” Also relevant is F&R, 7. “There are proposed for our belief mysteries hidden in God 
which, unless they are divinely revealed, cannot be known.” 
193
 F&R, 8. 
194
 F&R, 9. 
195
 F&R, 13. 
196
 F&R, 13. Also relevant is F&R, 13. ―The Church has always considered the act of entrusting oneself to 
God to be a moment of fundamental decision which engages the whole person”. 
197
 F&R, 22. 
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Fides et Ratio turns to the very revelation acclaimed by fideism as the only reliable 
source of truth to demonstrate the essential role of reason in the search for knowledge.
198
 
Not only does revelation seek to assist reason in its search
199
 but the witness of 
revelation is that faith and reason are natural and necessary partners in the search. 
 
Although Fides et Ratio acknowledges the impact of our flaws on the use and usefulness 
of reason, the document is far from agreeing with fideism that reason is fatally flawed. It 
claims, rather, that the certainty of reason is only ―partially obscured and weakened” in 
its natural state,
200
 and that “Christ ... redeemed reason from its weakness, setting it free 
from the shackles in which it had imprisoned itself”201 since it is sin that holds reason 
back.
202
 Far from avoiding reason as misleading, Fides et Ratio strongly urges a 
renewed confidence in reason‟s ability based on the fact that faith perfects, illuminates 
and complements reason.
203
 The desire for truth is so deeply ingrained in human beings 
that to refuse to search would be to “cast our existence into jeopardy.”204 We are urged 
therefore to bind together in order to soar to the contemplation of transcendent truth.
205
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 F&R, 16. ―What is distinctive in the biblical text is the conviction that there is a profound and 
indissoluble unity between the knowledge of reason and the knowledge of faith.” 
199
 F&R, 13. ―To assist reason in its effort to understand the mystery there are the signs which Revelation 
itself presents. These serve to lead the search for truth to new depths.‖ 
200
 F&R, 82. 
201
 F&R, 22. 
202
 F&R, 19. ―If human beings with their intelligence fail to recognize God as Creator of all, it is not 
because they lack the means to do so, but because their free will and their sinfulness place an impediment 
in the way.‖ 
203
 F&R, 43. ―Just as grace builds on nature and brings it to fulfilment, so faith builds upon and perfects 
reason” 
204
 F&R, 29. Also relevant is F&R, 33. ―Men and women are on a journey of discovery which is humanly 
unstoppable.‖ 
205
 F&R, 48, 83 and 84. 
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―Faith therefore has no fear of reason, but seeks it out and has trust in it,”206 specifically 
seeking reason‘s assistance in understanding, interpreting and communicating the 
contents of divine revelation to God‘s people and to those yet unbelievers,207 since the 
truth conferred by Revelation is a truth to be understood in the light of reason
208
 and 
exegetes ignore philosophy at their peril.
209
 
 
Fides et Ratio does not suggest we accept all the efforts of reason uncritically. As we 
have seen above, it properly points out examples of the mistakes that are possible when 
reason unmoors itself from the port of Revelation. The document urges us to join the 
Church in a properly critical assessment of systems of reason.
210
 It speaks of a ―critical 
consciousness‖ of the Fathers in relation to philosophy as indicating that ―they were not 
naive thinkers”211 but exercised intellectual honesty in order neither to accept reason 
uncritically nor to engage in “a prejudiced rejection of it”.212 Nor does faith seek to 
dominate reason but intervenes to ensure its proper and pure operation.
213
 
 
Relying solely on faith will expose theologians to the risk, firstly, that an unreasonable 
faith soon degenerates into mere superstition and, secondly, that in the use of language, 
logical structures and attempting to understand what it is they believe and apply it to 
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 F&R, 43. 
207
 F&R, 5. 
208
 F&R, 35. 
209
 F&R, 55. ―Those who... study Sacred Scripture should always remember that the various 
hermeneutical approaches have their own philosophical underpinnings, which need to be carefully 
evaluated before they are applied to the sacred texts.‖ 
210
 F&R, 39. “It is clear from history, then, that Christian thinkers were critical in adopting philosophical 
thought.” 
211
 F&R, 41. 
212
 F&R, 43. 
213
 F&R, 16. “Faith intervenes not to abolish reason's autonomy nor to reduce its scope for action.” 
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life, theologians necessarily adopt and assume philosophical presuppositions. Without a 
consciously critical approach, ―theologians run the risk of locking themselves within 
thought-structures poorly adapted to the understanding of faith.‖214 Finally, the artificial 
attempt to sunder the relationships between faith and reason is an attack on our very 
nature.
 215
 More importantly, it undermines the truth itself.  
 
It is understandable, then, that Fides et Ratio specifically warns against “a resurgence of 
fideism”216 and its variants217 which seeks to reduce the search for truth to Sacred 
Scripture, to a core of dogmatic formulae, and rejects the breadth of revelation in 
Scripture and Tradition, together with the doctrines which the Church has properly 
reasoned from this basis. 
 
Drawing on Pius XII,
218
 Fides et Ratio reminds the reader that neglecting the philosophy 
that underpins traditional terminology risks misunderstanding the Church‘s teaching at 
the very least.
219
 Thus theologians are urged to ―to pay special attention to the 
philosophical implications of the word of God” in their studies.220 
 
 
                                                 
214
 F&R, 77. 
215
 F&R, 85. ―The segmentation of knowledge, with its splintered approach to truth and consequent 
fragmentation of meaning, keeps people today from coming to an interior unity.” 
216
 F&R, 55. 
217
 F&R, 55. Highlights a latent fideism in which ―the scant consideration accorded to speculative 
theology, and in disdain for the classical philosophy from which the terms of both the understanding of 
faith and the actual formulation of dogma have been drawn.” 
218
 F&R, 55 citing Humani Generis, 1950. 
219
 F&R, 55, cf 65. ―not only in grasping the logical and conceptual structure of the propositions in which 
the Church's teaching is framed, but also, indeed primarily, in bringing to light the salvific meaning of 
these propositions for the individual and for humanity.” 
220
 F&R, 105. 
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Conclusion to the Fiducial Model 
This model seems pessimistic, even deeply suspicious of reason. According to the 
fiducial model, reason is flawed, perhaps fatally, and cannot be relied upon to enable us 
to reach the truth about God. Even worse than mere incapacity, reason may actively 
mislead us about God, leading us away from the truth. Nevertheless, reason is employed 
in every aspect of this model of faith. This model first engages reason to decide that 
there is a God. Second, to discern which writings to consider revealed by God. Third, to 
decipher the sentences contained in these books of revelation to determine which of 
these sentences contain promises of God. Fourth, to determine which of these promises 
are salvific (in this model: God‘s promises of forgiveness, mercy and salvation). Fifth, 
to determine that these promises should be applied to the individual reader. And, finally, 
reason is engaged in the act of submission to God. Even a deliberate act of laying reason 
aside (if that were humanly possible) is itself an act of the intellect, moved by the will. 
While acknowledging that some truths about God are beyond human reason, this model 
does not abandon the practical use of reason in its methodology, even if denouncing it to 
varying degrees in its theory. 
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The Affective / Experiential Model 
The fourth model in Dulles‘ scheme makes a strong the link between faith and human 
experience. Faith, in this model, is not a message which must be believed but an 
experience of the divine which becomes the message. It might be possible to find 
elements of an emphasis on human experience in faith among some Mystics, and among 
various pietistic movements. Indeed it would be difficult to describe faith in any 
meaningful way while at the same time excluding reference to any kind of human 
experience.  But in reaction to the extreme rationalism of the seventeenth century, there 
sprang up a deeply sentimental view of faith. Some prominent examples include, as we 
noted in passing above, the profound conversion experience of the Catholic Pascal. 
Pascal‘s conversion experience led him to a new understanding of faith inspired by the 
experience itself.
221
 The case of John Wesley (1703-1791) also led to a changed 
theological view of faith, based on the experience itself. While Pascal‘s experience led 
him to emphasise complete reliance on God, his personal peace in total surrender to God 
forms a significant part of his account of faith. Wesley experienced ―a strange warming 
of the heart‖ while hearing the preface to Luther‘s commentary on Romans read 
aloud.
222
 He remained committed to the doctrine that we are justified by grace alone, but 
began preaching a faith which he described as a personal experience and a resultant 
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 Blackburn, Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, 278. 
222
 Bonamy Dobree, John Wesley (London: Duckworth, 1933), 65. ―A layman was reading aloud Luther‘s 
preface to the Epistle to the Romans; and then, at about a quarter to nine, while the voice was describing 
the change which God works in the heart through faith in Christ, Wesley felt his own ‗strangely warmed.‘ 
All at once he was sure that he did trust in Christ, Christ alone, for salvation; and an assurance was given 
him that the Son of God had taken away his sins, his, and saved him from the law of sin and death. Ah 
yes, he had believed before, but with the faith of a servant, not that of a Son. Then, faith had been assent, 
even if an assent to what God had revealed because He had revealed it; but this, now, was a sensation, a 
warming of the heart; it felt like a physical embrace. At last.‖ cf. Dulles, The Assurance of Things Hoped 
For, 68-69. 
8 July 2010 Page 49 
piety (good works). Wesley‘s ‗Methodism‖ involving a kind of subjective experience as 
at least a partially determinative factor in faith, is still influential today.
223
 
 
In the early nineteenth century Friedrich D.E. Schleiermacher (1768-1834) heralded a 
new era in theological study of faith, developing an emphasis on individual experience 
into a theology of culture as shared experience.
224
 Schleiermacher sought to take 
account of sentiment, community, tradition and history as they are experienced and 
interpreted by the individual. He described faith as the feeling of certainty that 
dependence on a ―transcendent reality‖ brings.225 Edward Schillebeeckx (1914-2009) 
seems to take up the theme of Auguste Sabatier (1839-1901) who taught that religious 
dogmas were simply human attempts to describe a common religious experience.
226
 
Schillebeeckx laid much emphasis on experience in regard to faith, placing emphasis on 
the local community over the authority of the entire Church and an emphasis on the 
individual experience of Christ over the dogmatic formulations.
227
 According to this 
model, attempts to express the faith in dogmatic formulae are incomplete expressions of 
truth so it is impossible to consider them binding on individual faith. Schillebeeckx 
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 Methodist ecclesial communities claim a total of over 6 million communicants worldwide (The 
Catholic Encyclopaedia, http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/10237b.htm Accessed 18 May, 2010.)  
224
 Colin Brown, Philosophy and the Christian Faith (Downers Grove, Intervarsity, 1968), 108. ―It is with 
justice that Karl Barth applied to Schleiermacher some words ... first applied to Fredrick the Great: ‗He 
did not found a school, but an era.‘‖ 
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 Friedrich D.E. Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith (London, T&T Clark, 1999), 12. "The self-
identical essence of piety, is this : the consciousness of being absolutely dependent, or, which is the same 
thing, of being in relation with God.‖ Paraphrased by Dulles, The Assurance of Things Hoped For, 78. 
226
 Edward Schillebeeckx OP, Christ the Sacrament of the Encounter with God (MaryLand, Sheed & 
Ward, 1963), 65. ―Symbolising ... creates the possibility of grasping what has been experienced; it makes 
it possible to intensify his religious experience. So the ―external cult‖ becomes a manifestation of the 
―internal worship of God.‖ 
227
 Gregory Moses calls Schillebeeckx as a ―partial constructivist‖. By which he means that Schillebeeckx 
believes that experience and traditional structures affect each other, as opposed to the total constructivist 
who believes that the movement is one way. (Gregory Moses, ―Faith and Reason: Naturalised and 
Relativised‖ in Fisher & Ramsay, Faith and Reason – Friends or Foes in the New Millennium?, 41-42. 
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insisted that dogmatic formulae must be open to revision on the basis of ongoing human 
experience. H. Richard Niebuhr (1894-1962) followed Schleiermacher in beginning the 
study of faith with an analysis of human religious consciousness. Niebuhr emphasised 
the relationship between Christ and culture, defining culture as the ―temporal and 
material realisation of values.‖228 Niebuhr spoke of a culture-devoid-of-Christ as 
opposed to a culture-transformed-by-Christ, advocating the latter.
229
 Niebuhr argues that 
faith is found in every human community in the form of mutual trust and loyalty. Faith 
is triadic in that it involves the individual, the community and the cause by which they 
are united. The ‗cause‘ of Christ evokes the trust and loyalty which unite the 
community. Jesus is present not so much in the accounts of first century witnesses but in 
the experience of the community of faith.
230
 
 
While Schleiermacher and Sabatier saw faith as an experience,
231
 George Tyrrell (1861-
1909) saw experience as revelation by which we receive knowledge. Although Tyrrell 
enters ―an emphatic caveat against the sentimentalism, or emotionalism rightly or 
wrongly associated with the name of Schleiermacher‖, he insists that the spirit-life 
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 D A Carson, Christ and Culture Revisited (Michigan: Eerdmans, 2008), 12. 
229
 Carson, Christ and Culture Revisited, 12. ―Under this definition, Christ appears to be embraced by 
culture. Niebuhr survives this problem by restricting culture to the domain of the ―temporal and material 
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is, by ―culture‖ he means something like ―culture-devoid-of-Christ.‖ Then, as the discussion progresses 
and he works out what the relationship between Christ and culture might be, that culture might, for 
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that it was not before: ―culture-transformed-by-Christ.‖ The slipperiness of the ―culture‖ terminology is 
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230
 H Richard Niebuhr, Faith on Earth, (New Haven Conn.: Yale University Press, 1989), 23-30 in Dulles, 
The Assurance of Things Hoped For, 128. (See also Dulles, The Assurance of Things Hoped For, 129. 
―The risen Jesus is found today, not primarily in biblical stories of the empty tomb and appearances to the 
witnesses of antiquity but rather in the present community of faith.‖ 
231
 Dulles, The Assurance of Things Hoped For, 79. 
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penetrates our knowledge, feelings and will. Therefore it is impossible to think with 
Christ if we do not also feel with Him.
232
 
 
In the encyclical dealing with the modernists, Pope Pius X described faith as an interior 
longing for the divine that connects the individual with the divine.
233
 The experience of 
faith which is or perhaps results from this ‗faith‘ is also considered revelation in the 
proper sense. No external source of revelation is necessary nor of a higher authority.
234
 
Dogmas proposed by the Church are not revealed truth but simply benchmarks on the 
journey to truth. 
 
Preliminary thoughts on the Affective / Experiential Model 
Proponents of the affective/experiential model of faith seem paradoxically to harbour a 
very optimistic view of reason, trusting reason to decipher or even determine the nature 
and form of truth from experience. It is additionally positive in that it actively 
encourages the search for truth within our experience of life. Discerning some kind of 
sense from random happenstance requires an active reason, particularly since 
proponents of the model tend to discount revelation or dogmatic formulae as 
authoritative or even as reliable guidelines. Since formulae of faith written by others are 
merely indicators of the authors‘ own ‗faith experiences‘, the proponent of the 
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 George Tyrrell, Lex Credendi – A Sequel to Lex Orandi (Bibliolife, 2009), 16. ―Religion does not 
consist in knowing; it does not consist in feeling; it does not consist in willing and doing, nor is it a sum or 
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 Pascendi Dominici Gregis, 7. ―The need of the divine, according to the principles of Fideism, excites 
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 Pascendi Dominici Gregis, 8. ―Religious consciousness is given as the universal rule, to be put on an 
equal footing with revelation, and to which all must submit, even the supreme authority of the Church.‖ 
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affective/experiential model is left with reason alone as the final determinant of truth, if 
any such thing as ‗truth‘ can be clearly identified in this model.  
 
A problem with deciphering the divine from the mundane is related to the nature of the 
Christian God. In Christian doctrine, God is, by definition, outside of His creation. If 
God is not part of this world, then how can we hope to perceive him? The Christian faith 
points to certain experiences of the divine, the sacraments being the primary example, 
but these can only clearly be seen as divine in light of revelation; the experiences of the 
outward symbols themselves do not reveal the entire truth contained within.
235
 
 
Another significant concern is that experience seems to be treated without suspicion in 
this model. That is, the ‗message‘ of experience is normative, or at the very least 
received as ‗morally neutral.‘ As I have suggested, reason is required to discern random 
happenstance from meaningful experience, but such a judgement would seem difficult 
without some clear guidelines. Since the proponents of this model do not seem to base 
their definition of an experience in mere pleasant sensations, how would they discern a 
‗good‘ experience from a ‗bad‘ experience? In order to discern a transcendent value 
from a particular experience human beings need some sort of objective criteria.
236
 It is 
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 Robert Sokolowski, 
B001H9XPQ4
The God of Faith and Reason: Foundations of Christian 
Theology (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1995), 134. ―If the Christian God is not 
part of the world, there is a sense in which we cannot hope to perceive or experience him, because he 
would have to be presented as one of the kinds of things in the world, differentiated from other kinds, and 
the experience that presents him would have to be different from our other perceptions.‖ 
236
Tracey Rowland, Culture and the Thomist Tradition after Vatican II (Abingdon: Routledge, 2003), 80. 
―If the will is to be receptive to a virtuous  development, especially to being motivated by charity and 
love, it must have an experience of goodness; and if the intellect is to be receptive to a virtuous use, 
especially to perfection by the theological virtue of faith, then it must first have some experience of truth; 
and if the memory is to be receptive to the theological virtue of hope, then it needs an experience of the 
beautiful.‖ 
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possible some experiences may even seem to contradict the truth. Without some sort of 
criteria, human beings would be abandoning themselves to be driven before the random 
winds of experience.
237
  
 
The model seems to leave open the question of the object of faith. What is it exactly that 
the intellect grasps when a proponent of this model talks about having ‗faith‘ based on 
individual or shared experience? There would seem to be nothing objective or certain 
about the object of this belief, leaving individual reason with the unenviable task of 
determining the object, assenting to it and simultaneously guaranteeing its certainty. The 
sharing of this ‗message‘ gained from experience would also engage reason to cipher the 
transmission in such a way as to effectively communicate a ‗truth‘ which could only be 
obtained by one‘s experience. Presumably the transmission itself counts as an 
experience for the person to whom it is being communicated, but the communication 
experienced would need reason to decipher, analyse and determine its meaning. 
 
The Affective/Experiential model in Fides et Ratio 
Positive 
With the proponents of the affective/experiential model, Fides et Ratio describes the 
human search for truth beginning with man‟s wonder at his surroundings238 which leads 
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 Robert Spaemann, ―Rationality and Faith in God‖ in Communio – Winter 2005, 624. ―The good, which 
does not manifest itself, or does so only on occasion, in those things that actually occur, but rather in the 
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him into a deeper contemplation of his own unique place in creation.
239
 This search for 
knowledge is so deeply set in the human heart that it is unstoppable.
240
 To deny it would 
“cast our existence into jeopardy.”241 
 
This agreement goes further still in relation to human experience being a legitimate 
starting point in the journey to discover truth. The daily experience of suffering ensures 
that questions such as “Does life have a meaning?” cannot be ignored242 particularly in 
light of our inevitable death. The experience of existence is the starting point in the 
human search for truth,
243
 constituting a “privileged locus” for metaphysical enquiry.244 
Every human being is, therefore, a seeker of truth.
245
 
 
The encyclical notes that humans have recorded aspects of this search in various artistic 
forms,
246
 even while highlighting philosophy as the greatest application of human ability 
in the search for truth. It seems to push this agreement with the affective/experiential 
                                                 
239
 F&R, Introduction. ―The more human beings know reality and the world, the more they know 
themselves in their uniqueness, with the question of the meaning of things and of their very existence 
becoming ever more pressing.” 
240
 F&R, 33. ―men and women are on a journey of discovery which is humanly unstoppable.” 
241
 F&R, 29. ―The thirst for truth is so rooted in the human heart that to be obliged to ignore it would cast 
our existence into jeopardy.” Also relevant is F&R, 17 “The desire for knowledge is so great and it works 
in such a way that the human heart... yearns for the infinite riches which lie beyond, knowing that there is 
to be found the satisfying answer to every question as yet unanswered.” 
242
 F&R, 25. ―The daily experience of suffering—in one's own life and in the lives of others—and the 
array of facts which seem inexplicable to reason are enough to ensure that a question as dramatic as the 
question of meaning cannot be evaded.” 
243
 F&R, 25. ―The truth comes initially to the human being as a question: Does life have a meaning? 
Where is it going?” 
244
 F&R, 83. ―In a special way, the person constitutes a privileged locus for the encounter with being, and 
hence with metaphysical enquiry.” 
245
 F&R, 28. ―One may define the human being, therefore, as the one who seeks the truth.” 
246
 F&R, 24. ―Through literature, music, painting, sculpture, architecture and every other work of their 
creative intelligence they have declared the urgency of their quest.” 
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model further suggesting that people seek to shape a personal “philosophy” based on 
their personal and communal experience.
247
  
 
Far from being limited to contemplation of the mundane, both the affective/experiential 
model and Fides et Ratio assert that “in the far reaches of the human heart there is a 
seed of desire and nostalgia for God”248 and that this search for truth is one which enjoys 
divine assistance.
249
  
 
This search is legitimately hopeful because God intends to reveal himself to “all people, 
in every age and in every part of the world.”250 Our reason is capable of discerning 
transcendent truth from the experience and events,
251
 and so we have good reason to 
hope that reason can soar to the contemplation of transcendent truth.
252
  
 
One of the earliest aspects of human wonder is the realisation that we share this 
existence with others like us, people who share our experiences and our search for the 
truth.
253
 The communal nature of human beings is a revelation in itself, according to 
Fides et Ratio, leading us to contemplate the meaning behind other people‘s experiences 
                                                 
247
 Weinandy suggests that Webster is so concerned about Fides et Ratio‘s support for the Experiential 
approach that he, Webster, portrays John Paul II as a ‗Schleiermacher in white‘ Weinandy, Thomas 
―Fides et Ratio: A Response to Thomas Webster‖ New Blackfriars Vol. 81, n.952, p229, 2000.  
248
 F&R, 24. 
249
 F&R, 16. ―Faith sharpens the inner eye, opening the mind to discover in the flux of events the 
workings of Providence.” 
250
 F&R, 64. 
251
 F&R, 99. ―Philosophical enquiry can help greatly to clarify the relationship between truth and life, 
between event and doctrinal truth, and above all between transcendent truth.” 
252
 F&R, 41. ―Reason could rise to the higher planes of thought, providing a solid foundation for the 
perception of being, of the transcendent and of the absolute.” 
253
 F&R, 4. ―Human beings are astonished to discover themselves as part of the world, in a relationship 
with others like them, all sharing a common destiny.” 
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and the shared traditions of the culture in which man finds himself immersed.
254
 It is 
within this community that man learns that to trust the wisdom and technology which 
underpins and enables the community to function, is to believe.
255
 
 
From the very beginning the Church has engaged with culture.
256
 The community of 
believers is not tied to one culture
257
 but is described “a partner in humanity‘s shared 
struggle to arrive at truth.‖258 Indeed the Church sees in each culture a limited 
manifestation of the search for ultimate truth and thus offers ―different paths to the 
truth.”259 The encyclical even suggests that for culture to flourish it must remain open to 
“assimilating new experiences.”260 For her own part, the Church insists that each culture 
be allowed to preserve their cultural identity
261
 and that she must pay attention to the 
cultural context of her audience when communicating divine revelation.
262
 
 
                                                 
254
 F&R, 31. ―Human beings are not made to live alone. They are born into a family and in a family they 
grow, eventually entering society through their activity. From birth, therefore, they are immersed in 
traditions which give them not only a language and a cultural formation but also a range of truths in which 
they believe almost instinctively.” 
255
 F&R, 31. ―Who, for instance, could assess critically the countless scientific findings upon which 
modern life is based? Who could personally examine the flow of information which comes day after day 
from all parts of the world and which is generally accepted as true? Who in the end could forge anew the 
paths of experience and thought which have yielded the treasures of human wisdom and religion? This 
means that the human being—the one who seeks the truth—is also the one who lives by belief.” 
256
 F&R, 70. ―From the time the Gospel was first preached, the Church has known the process of 
encounter and engagement with cultures.” 
257
 F&R, 71. ―No one culture can ever become the criterion of judgment, much less the ultimate criterion 
of truth with regard to God's Revelation.” 
258
 F&R, 2. 
259
 F&R, 70 ―Therefore they offer different paths to the truth, which assuredly serve men and women well 
in revealing values which can make their life ever more human.” 
260
 F&R, 71. 
261
 F&R, 71. ―the proclamation of the Gospel in different cultures allows people to preserve their own 
cultural identity.” 
262
 F&R, 72. cf. Rowland, Culture and the Thomist Tradition after Vatican II, 45-46. ―The logic of John 
Paul II‘s statement in Fides et Ratio is that, notwithstanding the geographical provenance of this culture, it 
retains a value for people of all societies, since ... Greco-Latin culture can in part be defined by its quest 
for the achievement of a universal culture.‖  
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Negative 
The discordance between the affective/experiential model of faith and Fides et Ratio is 
not so much in the discussion of the value of experience in the search for truth, but in 
the denial of objective revelation and authoritative truth entrusted to and promulgated by 
the Church on behalf of her Lord Jesus Christ. 
 
The encyclical cites the uncertainty of experience,
263
 the tragic reality of the horrific 
experiences of our age and the despairing nihilism it has inspired
264
 as reasons that we 
“cannot stop short at experience alone”265 in our search for meaning. If our search for 
truth is solely based on experience we risk reducing our understanding of transcendent 
truth to the limits of our experience.
266
 
 
Part of the problem seems to be the attribution of experience to faith rather than reason. 
While Fides et Ratio acknowledges the value of experience it attributes experience and 
its interpretation to reason, while faith relies specifically on divinely revealed truth.
267
 In 
fact the encyclical distinguishes between scientific investigation based on evidence and 
experience, philosophical inquiry engaging the speculative intellect and finally religious 
truth which engages philosophy but is based on revealed truth.
268
 
                                                 
263
 F&R, 80. ―Experience is not absolute: it is neither uncreated nor self-generating. God alone is the 
Absolute.” 
264
 F&R, 91. ―This nihilism has been justified in a sense by the terrible experience of evil which has 
marked our age.” 
265
 F&R, 83. 
266
 F&R, 97. ―An ecclesiology developed solely on the model of civil society, would be hard pressed to 
avoid the danger of such reductionism.” 
267
 F&R, 9. ―Based upon God's testimony and enjoying the supernatural assistance of grace, faith is of an 
order other than philosophical knowledge which depends upon sense perception and experience and 
which advances by the light of the intellect alone.” 
268
 F&R, 27. 
8 July 2010 Page 58 
 
Fides et Ratio points out that one of the dangers of relying solely on experience in our 
search for truth is an “undifferentiated pluralism, based upon the assumption that all 
positions are equally valid” based on a pessimism regarding truth itself.269 In attempting 
to remain open to all truth claims, such pluralism necessarily denies the objective truth 
claims proposed by the Church.
270
 Specifically, that in Christ alone we find complete 
salvific truth.
271
 
 
In seeking to emphasise human experience, seekers of truth are in danger of 
“exchanging relevance for truth”272 which necessarily abandons hope in an answer 
capable of satisfying the basic questions which began the search. While never 
abandoning her search for truth in the experiences of history, the Church has always 
taken great care to critically examine the input of various cultures and philosophies in 
the light of the revealed truth entrusted to her.
273
 
 
                                                 
269
 F&R, 5. 
270
 F&R, 69. ―Others still, prompted by a mistaken notion of cultural pluralism, simply deny the universal 
value of the Church's philosophical heritage.” 
271
 F&R, 38. ―There are many paths which lead to truth, but since Christian truth has a salvific value, any 
one of these paths may be taken, as long as it leads to the final goal, that is to the Revelation of Jesus 
Christ.” 
272
F&R, 87. ―By exchanging relevance for truth, this form of modernism shows itself incapable of 
satisfying the demands of truth to which theology is called to respond.” 
273
 F&R, 37. ―Following Saint Paul, other writers of the early centuries, especially Saint Irenaeus and 
Tertullian, sound the alarm when confronted with a cultural perspective which sought to subordinate the 
truth of Revelation to the interpretation of the philosophers.” Also relevant here is F&R, 55 “This happens 
particularly when theologians, through lack of philosophical competence, allow themselves to be swayed 
uncritically by assertions which have become part of current parlance and culture but which are poorly 
grounded in reason.” 
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As noted above, natural reason can easily flounder when it is cast adrift from the guiding 
light of revelation.
274
 Without this guidance, philosophy is in grave danger of doing 
itself damage,
275
 taking side tracks,
276
 straying from the path of truth.
277
 As Fides et 
Ratio warns, “sundered from that truth, individuals are at the mercy of caprice.”278 
 
Far from denying the value of experience, the Church asserts the primacy of those 
experiences of the community of faith which are reliable markers in the search for truth 
and genuinely transcend the everyday.
279
 She acknowledges that we belong to a 
community and culture with a heritage which cannot be abandoned in favour of a 
limited expression of human experience such as a modern ‗culture‘. So our search for 
truth is properly sustained within its ―ecclesial context‖.280 It is in this context that we 
can assert that revelation is indeed ―immersed in time and history‖ but that this is 
concretely expressed in the incarnation of the second Person of the Blessed Trinity.
281
  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
274
 F&R, 28. 
275
 F&R, 75. ―In refusing the truth offered by divine Revelation, philosophy only does itself damage, since 
this is to preclude access to a deeper knowledge of truth.” 
276
 F&R, 48. ―Deprived of what Revelation offers, reason has taken side-tracks which expose it to the 
danger of losing sight of its final goal.” 
277
 F&R, 73. ―reason is offered guidance and is warned against paths which would lead it to stray from 
revealed Truth and to stray in the end from the truth pure and simple.” 
278
 F&R, 5. 
279
 F&R, 85. ―The appeal to tradition is not a mere remembrance of the past; it involves rather the 
recognition of a cultural heritage which belongs to all of humanity. Indeed it may be said that it is we who 
belong to the tradition and that it is not ours to dispose of at will.” 
280
 F&R, 101. 
281
 F&R, 15. 
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Conclusion to the Affective / Experiential Model 
This model seems to express a sincere longing for the truth, but rejects the extreme 
positions which propose that truth can only be reached by „reason alone‟ or „revelation 
alone‟. In abandoning both the extreme of rationalism and rejecting blind adherence to 
dogmatic formulae, the affective/experiential model seems to be an attempt to restore 
reason to its proper relationship with the data of human experience. Although it rejects 
reason as the sole source and arbiter of truth, it relies heavily on reason to discern 
between experience as a message of truth and random happenstance. In doing so the 
proponents of this model seem to presume that the world, and our experience of it, are 
coherent. The pessimism this model seems to hold regarding dogmatic or absolute truth 
is not a demotion of reason but a grand promotion of reason. Reason, in this model, has 
the heavy responsibility of sifting and weighing the data of experience alone, without 
the aid of revelation or magisterial guidance.  
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The Obediential Model  
The fifth model of faith in Dulles‘ schema emphasises obedience to divine authority. 
Faith, in this model, begins with acknowledgment of man‘s inability to reach 
knowledge, virtue or salvation on his own power. We must abandon all efforts to 
understand, work, cooperate or in any way contribute to our own redemption. We must 
instead commit ourselves to complete obedience to God as the sovereign Lord whose 
Word has a sovereign claim over believers. Faith is abandonment of all attempts to save 
ourselves and total surrender to God‘s saving plan.  
 
Not to be confused with a doctrine of righteousness by obedience to the law, this model 
emphasizes obedience to God as abandonment of hope and pride in our own efforts and 
ability in favour of complete submission to God as the only hope for us. To some extent 
this model is supported by the Old Testament use of הסח282 in a similar manner other 
Hebrew words usually translated as ‗faith‘ (discussed above). The word usually means 
―to take refuge‖ (usually in God).283 St Paul too points to this divine trust when he 
speaks of ―the obedience of faith‖284 and ―the obedience that leads to righteousness.‖285 
 
A genius in science and mathematics, Blaise Pascal (1623-1662) retired to a monastery 
after an intense personal conversion. He declared in his Pensees “[This] is what faith is: 
God perceived intuitively from the heart, not reason.‖ 286 Faith, says Pascal, rests on 
                                                 
282
 Wigram The New Englishman’s Hebrew Concordance, 449. הסח is used 37 times in the Old 
Testament. 
283
 Holladay, Ed. A Concise Hebrew and Aramaic Lexicon of the Old Testament, 111. ―To seek refuge.‖  
284
 Rom 1:5, 16:26. 
285
 Rom 6:16. 
286
 Colin Brown, Philosophy and the Christian Faith (Downers Grove, Intervarsity, 1968), 58. 
8 July 2010 Page 62 
total submission to God‘s authority. We know God through an intuition of the heart, not 
by reason.
287
 As a Catholic attempting to promote a view of faith that seemed to reflect 
the Protestants of a century before, Pascal was regarded as something of an oddity in his 
time, even if he was admired for his brilliant mind.
288
 
 
It was indeed a Protestant, a Swiss Reformed theologian, Karl Barth (1886-1968), who 
later proposed a ‗dialectic theology‘289 that insisted faith is not intelligible: it is its own 
presupposition.
290
 No finite creature, according to Barth, is capable of comprehending 
the infinite. In fact, attempting to adhere to a ‗religion of reason‘ is a positive barrier to 
true faith because it limits God‘s sovereignty.291 So to have faith is to ‗leap into the 
dark‘292 but not to abandon hope. Barth spoke of abandoning false hope, that is, hope in 
our own ability to know or to save, and because we abandon ourselves as saviours we 
also abandon despair, since placing trust in human endeavour can only lead to despair. 
True hope is hope gained by trusting God for everything.
293
 Nevertheless he insisted that 
theology, when grounded in faith, can be a truly rational discipline.
294
  
                                                 
287
 Martin Turnell, Tr. Pensees (Harvill Press, 1962), 163. ―The heart has reasons which are unknown to 
reason... It is the heart which is aware of God and not reason. That is what faith is: God perceived 
intuitively by the heart, not reason.‖ in Brown, Philosophy and the Christian Faith, 59. 
288
 Brown, Philosophy and the Christian Faith, 60. 
289
 Also called ―crisis theology‖ cf. Blackburn, Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, 236. 
290
 Karl Barth, The Epistle to the Romans (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), 99. ―There are, 
however, no preliminaries to faith, no required standard of education or intelligence, no peculiar temper of 
mind or heart, no special economic status. There are no human avenues of approach, no ‗way of 
salvation‘; to faith there is no ladder which must first be scaled. Faith is its own initiation, its own 
presupposition.‖ 
291
 Barth, The Epistle to the Romans cited in Dulles, The Assurance of Things Hoped For, 116. 
292
 Barth, The Epistle to the Romans, 107. ―God is ... the justifier of those who dare to leap into the void.‖ 
293
 Karl Barth, The Epistle to the Philippians (Louisville: Wesrtminster John Knox Press, 2002), 17. ―It 
was not Paul who had ‗begun the good work‘ in Philippi, nor did the Philippians themselves do so by 
becoming converted. God began it. That strips them and him of all glory, all self-assurance, but precisely 
therewith also of all despondency.‖ 
294
 Henri DeLubac points out that ―To reduce everything to obedience where faith is concerned may be a 
manner of saying that you do not care the slightest about truth. And it is lacking thereby in the deepest 
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A contemporary of Barth, and partner in ‗dialectic theology‘,295 Rudolph Bultmann 
(1884-1976) defines faith as an abandonment of our attempts to save ourselves and as a 
complete surrender to God.
296
 Like Barth, Bultmann describes faith as ―a leap into the 
dark‖ but insists this is not a risk for those of faith, because they know whom they are 
leaping towards. Also associated with ‗dialectical theology‘, Lutheran philosophical 
theologian, Paul Tillich (1886-1965), insisted that faith is perfected only when we are 
grasped by the ultimate truth, and in being grasped we find assurance, knowledge and 
peace.
297
 
 
Another Lutheran theologian, Dietrich Bonhoeffer (1906-1945), espoused a seemingly 
Barthian view (in 1932) that all knowledge is a gift of faith and that theology is the 
attempt to set forth what is already possessed by faith. Christ creates faith in us which 
causes us to believe. Although agreeing with the Protestant assertion that we are saved 
by ‗faith alone‘ Bonheoffer is concerned with a distortion of this doctrine which leads to 
                                                                                                                                               
kind of obedience, that of spirit.‖ Henri DeLubac, Paradoxes of Faith (San Fransico: Ignatius Press, 
1987), 222. 
295
 Dulles, The Assurance of Things Hoped For, 116. ―In different ways Karl Barth, Rudolf Bultmann and 
Paul Tillich exemplify the dialectical movement.‖ 
296
 Rudolf Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament Vol.1 (London: SCM Press, 1957), 330-331. 
―Faith‘s obedient submission to God‘s ―grace,‖ the acceptance of the Cross of Christ, is the surrender of 
man‘s old understanding of himself, in which he lives ―unto himself,‖ tried to achieve life by his own 
strength, and by that very fact falls victim to the powers of sin and death and loses himself. Therefore, 
―faith‖ – as ―obedience of faith‖ – is also released from these powers. The new self-understanding which 
is bestowed with ―faith‖ is that of freedom, in which the believer gains life and thereby his own self.‖  
297
 Paul Tillich, The New Being (London: SCM Press, 1956), 77. ―Looking at God, we realise that all the 
shortcomings of our experience are of no importance. Looking at God, we see that we do not have Him as 
an object of our knowledge, but that He has us as the subject our existence. Looking at God ... we may not 
grasp anything in the depth of our uncertainty, but that we are grasped by something ultimate which keeps 
us in its grasp and from which we may strive in vain to escape, remains absolutely certain.‖ 
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what he calls ―cheap grace‖.298 That is, the false belief that faith in God saves even 
where there is no corresponding obedience to God‘s love. While maintaining the 
formula faith alone saves, he insists faith is never alone. That is, faith is necessarily 
accompanied by obedience and love or it is not genuinely faith. Faith moving us to 
profound obedience is the main theme for Bonhoeffer.
299
 Faith itself drives the act of 
complete submission of life to obedience to God. Jesus did not call us to religion, says 
Bonhoeffer, but to life with Him. Failure to obey is abandonment of Christ Himself and, 
therefore, of Christianity.
300
   
 
Preliminary thoughts on the Obediential Model 
In common with the fiducial model, the obediential model is pessimistic about human 
reason. It seems that, for the proponents of this model of faith, the ‗image of God‘ in 
man has been so damaged by original sin that it has no effect. Where the fiducial model 
urges trust in God‘s promises of redemption, the obediential model calls on man to 
abandon any confidence in his own abilities. Trust in any human ability, including 
reason, is therefore distrusted as unbecoming pride and doomed to failure. The only 
hope for man is to humbly acknowledge his pathetic state and submit himself utterly to 
the Lord, who rightly claims our obedience as proper to himself. 
                                                 
298
 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, The Cost of Discipleship (London, SCM, 1993), 35. ―Cheap grace means the 
justification of the sin without the justification of the sinner. Grace alone does everything, they say, and so 
everything can remain as it was before.‖ And, ibid, 36 ―Cheap grace is the preaching of forgiveness 
without requiring repentance, baptism without Church discipline, Communion without confession, 
absolution without personal confession.‖ 
299
 Bonhoeffer, The Cost of Discipleship, 69. ―The call of Jesus ... was the call of the Word of God 
himself, and all that it required was single-minded obedience.‖; 70 ―it is only to this obedience that the 
promise of fellowship with Jesus is given.‖ (cf. The entire third chapter of the same work on ―single-
minded obedience.‖) 
300
 Bonhoeffer, The Cost of Discipleship, 44. ―We Lutherans have gathered like eagles round the carcase 
of cheap grace, and there we have drunk the poison which has killed the life of following Christ.‖  
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While criticising Fides et Ratio for, among other things, neglecting to focus on the Word 
of God as the only source of truth, John Webster argues that a focus on intellectus fidei 
runs the risk of losing proper respect for God as utterly other.
301
 Webster articulates the 
Protestant idea that calls for an acknowledgement of the failure of reason due to sin and 
for exegetical study of the texts to find the truth.
302
 His Catholic respondent, Thomas 
Weinandy agrees that we are called to an obedience of faith to the proclaimed Word.
303
 
But, even with this limited view of God‘s revelation, it would seem that reason is 
required to discern what truth, claiming to be ―revealed‖ by God, is to be trusted. Once 
we have somehow determined that the Christian Bible is the sole source of truth, reason 
must be employed to apprehend the command of God within that revelation, and to 
determine how that command can and/or should be applied in a concrete situation.
304
 
 
Since Scripture does not specifically address each of us personally by name, the 
individual hearer must rely on reason to grasp the command of God and determine it as 
applying to himself. After all, if it has not been explicitly stated in revelation that God 
has promised something to Joe Smith, then Joe Smith must rely on his reason to deduce 
that a revealed promise applies specifically to Joe Smith.  
                                                 
301
 John Webster, ―‗Fides et Ratio‘, articles 64-79‖ in New Blackfriars Vol. 81, n.949, 2000, 76. 
―intellectus fidei is described as the process of arranging the saving meaning of the propositions of divine 
Truth... but this is theology without terror, theology without deep suspicion of arranging the truth about 
God. No theology should ever dare to be positive unless it is also, at the same time, deeply conscious of 
its own impossibility.‖ 
302
 Webster, ―‗Fides et Ratio‘, articles 64-79‖ in New Blackfriars, 68-76. 
303
 Thomas Weinandy, ―Fides et Ratio: A Response to Thomas Webster‖ New Blackfriars Vol. 81, n.952, 
2000, 232. ―Nontheless, I want to emphasize that the auditus fiei is ultimately a matter ... of accepting in 
the obedience of faith the truth of the proclaimed Word.‖ 
304
 Weinandy, ―Fides et Ratio: A Response to Thomas Webster‖ New Blackfriars, 232. ―Exegesis of 
Scripture and of ‗the canon of Christian commentary‘ is... the enduring theological task, and so it is part 
of the intellectus fidei, the doing of theology ... The auditus fidei is the object upon which the intellectus 
fidei, the doing of theology, is founded and the source from which it springs and not vice versa.‖ 
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Even then, engaging in a determining act of submission to the divine Lord also engages 
the entire person, including the capacity to reason. Given that theologians of this view 
build their religious views using complex reasoning, it seems their profession of distrust 
in reason is not applied to all use of reason. 
 
The Obediential Model in Fides et Ratio 
Positive 
While Fides et Ratio encourages the search for knowledge, surety is based on the 
trustworthiness of God who reveals himself
305
 and to whom is owed the obedience of 
faith. Indeed “faith is said first to be an obedient response to God.”306 It is in this 
complete trusting surrender to God that a person can find certainty of faith.
307
  
 
The act of obedience to God is described as an act that engages the entire person in a 
fundamental expression of personal freedom.
308
 In complete commitment to God, the 
obedience of faith is possible by His grace.
309
 Profound humility marks this model even 
once the person has committed themselves completely to God. Faithful obedience is 
                                                 
305
 F&R, 8. ―This knowledge expresses a truth based upon the very fact of God who reveals himself, a 
truth which is most certain, since God neither deceives nor wishes to deceive.” 
306
 F&R, 13. (explicating Dei Verbum, 4). 
307
 F&R, 33. ―It is in this faithful self-giving that a person finds a fullness of certainty and security.” 
308
 F&R, 13. ―This is why the Church has always considered the act of entrusting oneself to God to be a 
moment of fundamental decision which engages the whole person. In that act, the intellect and the will 
display their spiritual nature, enabling the subject to act in a way which realizes personal freedom to the 
full.” 
309
 F&R, 15 citing Deut 30:11-14. 
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based on “fear of God”310 whose sovereignty and goodness provide us with certain 
comfort. 
 
Fides et Ratio expresses concern that many modern philosophers have lost hope in 
philosophy‘s ability to seek answers to the greatest questions.311 While this concern is 
related to certain regrettable trends in modern philosophy, the encyclical‘s concern 
regarding the reliability of reason is not restricted to modern philosophers. It seems to 
share the obediential model‘s concern that humanity‘s primal disobedience has so 
wounded reason that its ―capacity to know the truth was impaired.”312 Under sin, reason 
too becomes the prisoner of sin,
313
 helpless to reach for any meaningful answer to life‟s 
big questions. 
 
This tragic state of affairs has been evident throughout history where philosophy has 
often fallen into error.
314
 The encyclical points out that the earliest Church thinkers 
expressed profound doubts about the value of philosophy.
315
 The Scriptures themselves 
seem to denounce ―the wisdom of the world‖ in favour of the wisdom of God revealed 
                                                 
310
 F&R, 18. ―Such a path is not for the proud who think that everything is the fruit of personal conquest 
[but] grounded in the “fear of God” whose transcendent sovereignty and provident love in the governance 
of the world reason must recognize.” 
311
 F&R, 5. ―The hope that philosophy might be able to provide definitive answers ... has dwindled... 
rather than make use of the human capacity to know the truth, modern philosophy has preferred to 
accentuate the ways in which this capacity is limited and conditioned.”  
312
 F&R, 22. 
313
 F&R, 22. ―The eyes of the mind were no longer able to see clearly: reason became more and more a 
prisoner to itself.” 
314
 F&R, 49. ―Yet history shows that philosophy—especially modern philosophy—has taken wrong turns 
and fallen into error.” 
315
 F&R, 41. ―Consider Tertullian's question: “What does Athens have in common with Jerusalem? The 
Academy with the Church?” This clearly indicates the critical consciousness with which Christian 
thinkers from the first confronted the problem of the relationship between faith and philosophy.” 
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in Christ crucified.
316
 Even when man receives divine revelation, the encyclical suggests 
that reason cannot be given sovereignty over its interpretation.
317
 
 
Unable to rely on reason to discover or to alone reliably interpret revelation,
318
 the 
believer is encouraged to rely on the authoritative self revelation of God. This gift is 
freely and graciously given by God and without it we cannot hope to know and grasp the 
truth about him.
319
 While human reason can discern and grasp some limited knowledge 
about God, his existence, goodness and so on, the knowledge that is peculiar to faith 
surpasses human reason.
320
 In fact ―The teaching of the Saviour is perfect in itself and 
has no need of support.‖321 Thus the human being can be defined as ―the one who lives 
by belief.”322  
 
Negative 
As discussed in the fiducial model, this pessimistic view of reason is clearly rejected by 
Fides et Ratio. To reject reason‟s quest for meaning is to undermine the very nature of 
humanity.
323
 Revelation itself urges men on to a continuous and exhaustive search for 
                                                 
316
 F&R, 23 citing (1 Cor 1:20). 
317
 F&R, 42. ―Reason in fact is not asked to pass judgement on the contents of faith, something of which it 
would be incapable, since this is not its function.” 
318
 F&R, 15. ―The truth made known to us by Revelation is neither the product nor the consummation of 
an argument devised by human reason. It appears instead as something gratuitous, which itself stirs 
thought and seeks acceptance as an expression of love.” 
319
 F&R, 9. ―There are proposed for our belief mysteries hidden in God which, unless they are divinely 
revealed, cannot be known.” 
320
 F&R, 8. ―There exists a knowledge which is peculiar to faith, surpassing the knowledge proper to 
human reason.” 
321
 F&R, 38. 
322
 F&R, 31. 
323
 F&R, 29. ―The thirst for truth is so rooted in the human heart that to be obliged to ignore it would cast 
our existence into jeopardy.” 
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truth.
324
 The encyclical states that the Church not only encourages this search but that 
she values reason‟s ability to “attain goals which render people's lives ever more 
worthy.”325 
 
Against the proposal that humanity finds its answers solely in God‟s self revelation and 
thus does not need reason‟s search, the encyclical asserts that even though the truth 
revealed by God may never have been discovered by reason, this truth is accessible to 
reason once it is revealed.
326
 The Church sees philosophy “an indispensable help” in 
understanding revelation and in communicating the truth to others.
327
 
 
Acknowledging the limitations of reason, and the detrimental effects of our fallen 
nature, the encyclical explains the basis of this trust in reason as God‟s transforming 
grace which builds on reason‟s natural capacity and perfects it for God‟s purposes.328 
 
In opposition to the proponents of the obediential model, Fides et Ratio asserts that 
“faith has no fear of reason”329 but faith actively seeks the cooperation and assistance of 
reason in their mutual search,
330
 because the proper object of both is the Truth himself. 
                                                 
324
 F&R, 14. ―Revelation ... stirs the human mind to ceaseless effort; indeed, it impels reason continually 
to extend the range of its knowledge until it senses that it has done all in its power, leaving no stone 
unturned.” 
325
 F&R, 5. 
326
 F&R, 76. ―Revelation clearly proposes certain truths which might never have been discovered by 
reason unaided, although they are not of themselves inaccessible to reason.” 
327
 F&R, 5. 
328
 F&R, 43. ―Just as grace builds on nature and brings it to fulfilment, so faith builds upon and perfects 
reason.” 
329
 F&R, 43. ―Faith therefore has no fear of reason, but seeks it out and has trust in it.” 
330
 F&R, 34. ―On the contrary, the two modes of knowledge lead to truth in all its fullness.” 
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Faith does not seek to replace or reject reason
331
 but to enhance and assist it to search 
beyond the mundane to the transcendent. Not only is it possible for human beings to 
come to a unified understanding of truth,
332
 but it is impossible to attempt to separate 
faith and reason without severely retarding man‟s ability to succeed in the search.333  
 
Not only does reason have its unique scope of action in the search, reason is essential for 
understanding, interpreting and applying the truth revealed by God.
334
 Without reason, 
faith would run the risk of “withering into myth or superstition.”335 As discussed above, 
understanding what revelation proposes for belief requires at the very least a basic 
application of logical principles of language and thought which are proper to 
philosophy. Whether the proponents of this model like it or not, every hermeneutic has 
its own philosophical basis and requires critical use, continuous and careful evaluation 
before and after they are applied to the Sacred texts.
336
 If theologians naively ignored 
the philosophical underpinnings of hermeneutics they would run the risk of “locking 
themselves within thought-structures poorly adapted to the understanding of faith.”337 
 
                                                 
331
 F&R, 16. ―Faith intervenes not to abolish reason's autonomy nor to reduce its scope for action.” 
332
 F&R, 85. ―the human being can come to a unified and organic vision of knowledge.” 
333
 F&R, 16. ―reason and faith cannot be separated without diminishing the capacity of men and women to 
know themselves, the world and God in an appropriate way.” 
334
 F&R, 35. ―Revelation is a truth to be understood in the light of reason.” 
335
 F&R, 48. 
336
 F&R, 55. ―the various hermeneutical approaches have their own philosophical underpinnings, which 
need to be carefully evaluated before they are applied to the sacred texts.” 
337
 F&R, 77.  
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It is hardly surprising that Fides et Ratio specifically denounces those who do not share 
her confidence in reason
338
 and urges theologians to pay “special attention to the 
philosophical implications of the word of God.”339 
 
Conclusion to the Obediential Model 
Of all Dulles‘ models, the obediential model seems to be the least optimistic about 
reason. Even more than the fiducial model, it emphasises the flaws and limitations of 
human reason to the point where it seems hopeless, even dangerous, to place any hope 
in reason in the search for truth. The proponents of the obediential model, however, do 
not abandon reason entirely. Reason is necessary to recognise our limitations, to 
recognise the surer hope in God‘s revealed truth, to interpret revelation and for each 
individual and to apply God‘s promises to those individuals specifically. The single self 
determining act of surrender to God is still an act of the whole human person, including 
the action and participation of the intellect and will. Reason is, therefore, utilised as a 
tool of this method, even if not trusted as a reliable source of truth in itself.  
                                                 
338
 F&R, 52. ―The censures were delivered even-handedly: on the one hand, fideism and radical 
traditionalism, for their distrust of reason's natural capacities.” 
339
 F&R, 105. 
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The Praxis Model 
Confronted by examples of tragic disparity in various situations, liberation theologians 
developed a concept of faith as ‗praxis‘. Faith is action towards God‘s emancipation. 
Proponents of this model might claim support from the Old Testament where some 
psalms, for example, ask specifically for justice, restoration from oppressors and even 
vengeance against a hated enemy.
340
 The idea of a physical redemption promised or at 
least promoted by God portrays faith is a ―subversive memory‖ which recalls the 
freedom of Jesus and emancipates us from every kind of enslavement to earthly powers. 
To have faith is to actively involve oneself in the ‗praxis‘ of liberation.  
 
We may find something of a seed of this preference for the downtrodden in the writings 
of William Booth, the founder of the Salvation Army, where he describes his home 
country as ―Deepest Darkest England‖ and admonishes the Christians of that country for 
their lack of concern for the poor and weak.
341
 
 
When Peruvian Gustavo Gutierrez (1928 -       ) published his work A Theology of 
Liberation: History Politics and Salvation in 1971 he made only a few passing 
references to faith as such, but they represent a significant shift in thinking. This 
―Liberation Theology‖, as it is called, developed themes from certain European 
                                                 
340
 eg. Ps 1:8-9, 3:7, 9:3-6, 34:15-22, 35:9-10. 
341
 William Booth, Deepest Darkest England and the way out (London: McCorquodale & Co, 1890), 18. 
―What, then, is Darkest England?  For whom do we claim that "urgency" which gives their case priority 
over that of all other sections of their countrymen and countrywomen? I claim it for the Lost, for the 
Outcast, for the Disinherited of the World. These, it may be said, are but phrases.  Who are the Lost? 
Reply, not in a religious, but in a social sense, the lost are those who have gone under, who have lost their 
foothold in Society, those to whom the prayer to our Heavenly Father, "Give us day by day our daily 
bread," is either unfulfilled, or only fulfilled by the Devil's agency:  by the earnings of vice, the proceeds 
of crime, or the contribution enforced by the threat of the law.‖ 
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theologians (e.g. Schillebeeckx and Moltmann) who had made efforts to link faith more 
closely with social and political activism.
342
 Faith is, according to Gutierrez, ―an act of 
trust... a commitment to God and neighbour, a relationship with others ... the total 
human response to God, who saves through love.‖343 This ‗salvation‘, according to 
Gutierrez‘s later writings, seems to emphasise the immediate and socio-political more 
than the eternal. He insists that faith, while not providing a specific plan for social 
organisation, demands that we work actively for a just society. This faith, lived within 
human history, brings Christ‘s victory into the world in order to overcome it. He 
contends that the God of the Bible is a God who acts in concrete historical salvation 
within history, and that God orients history in a specific direction. Through his faithful 
people, God changes the world better to resemble his kingdom. God calls his people to 
be faithful to his social ideal, specifically in his constant call to uphold the downtrodden, 
oppressed and powerless. In Jesus Christ, God becomes the poor and suffering whom 
we must tend and defend. Faith does not end in personal belief but shines in action, in 
lived faith. To believe, then, is to ―love God and to be in solidarity with the poor and 
exploited of this world‖, and an engagement in the struggle for greater justice and 
liberation.
344
 He draws on Karl Marx‘s theory that the praxis that changes history is the 
way in which people discover themselves and their world. He insists there is no such 
                                                 
342
 Gustavo Gutierrez, ―A Theology of Liberation‖ in J Wogaman & D Strong Eds., Readings in Christian 
Ethics (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 1996), 341. ―The theology of liberation offers us ... a 
new way to do theology. Theology as critical reflection on historical praxis is a liberating theology, a 
theology of the liberating transformation of the history of mankind and also therefore that part of mankind 
– gathered into ecclesia which openly confesses Christ.‖ 
343
 Gutierrez, ―A Theology of Liberation‖ in Wogaman & Strong, Readings in Christian Ethics, 341. 
344
 Gustavo Gutierrez, The Power of the Poor in History, (1979; ET, Maryknoll, New York, Orbis, 1983), 
17 in Dulles, The Assurance of Things Hoped For, 156. 
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thing as a permanent theology, theology brings faith to the world it finds itself in and 
finds some means of bringing about the kingdom of God and returns to faith.
345
  
 
Another South American, Juan Luis Segundo (1925-1996) suggested that human life 
presupposes a ―choice of some ideal one presumes will be satisfying.‖ He suggests that 
most people choose the ideal of their family or friends or, in rarer cases, someone who 
embodies ideals they resonate with (such as Ché Guevara, or Christ). Faith does not 
attain any absolute object but is, rather, a process of ‗learning to learn‘. What man learns 
is ideologies (or a system of objects or goals), and through them new ideologies to deal 
with new situations that arise in history. Faith without ideologies, he says, is dead. Faith 
only makes sense if it is the foundation of a functioning ideology. Segundo too 
suggested that faith must be made historically concrete through the acceptance of a 
specific ideology. Although he admits adopting a Marxist ideology, Segundo denied he 
did so uncritically.
 346
 He contends that liberation theology, when distinguished from 
some extreme views associated with it, has a legitimate place within orthodox Catholic 
teaching.
347
 
 
                                                 
345
 The Theology of Liberation claims the support of Karl Rahner who, ―two weeks before his death, ...  
wrote to the Cardinal Archbishop of Lima and proclaimed, ―I am convinced of the orthodoxy of the 
theological work of Gustavo Gutierrez. The Theology of Liberation that he represents is entirely 
orthodox.‖ Juan Louis Seguno Theology and the Church: A Response to Cardinal Ratzinger and a 
Warning to the Whole Church (Minneapolis: Winston Press, 1985), 18.  
346
 Segundo claims that his ―careful epistemological critique‖, outlined in an entire volume of his Faith 
and Ideologies, is evidence that ―it would only be foolish to say that, in this case, ―impatience and a desire 
for results‖ has led [him] ―to turn to ... Marxist analysis.‖ Segundo Theology and the Church: A Response 
to Cardinal Ratzinger and a Warning to the Whole Church, 15. 
347
 Segundo claims support for his theology in the concept of ―the same preferential option for the poor 
that the Church as a whole has made its own.‖ Segundo Theology and the Church: A Response to 
Cardinal Ratzinger and a Warning to the Whole Church, 136. 
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John Paul II‘s development of a theology of work (drawing on Paul VI‘s Populorum 
Progressio) seems to promote at least some aspects of a Marxist critique of capitalism in 
denouncing ‗economic progress‘ as the determinative factor in culture.348 John Paul II 
insists that the dignity of human beings cannot be set aside in the work place and picked 
up again by engaging in more human pursuits after hours. He insists that ―not only is 
culture constituted through praxis, but human praxis in its authentically human character 
is also constituted through culture.‖349 In placing the dignity of work in terms of the 
transcendent, suggesting that ―beauty exists to entice us to work‖ John Paul II seems to 
blend Augustine, Thomas and Marx in his theology of work and culture.
350
 While he 
seems to employ some Marxist critiques, John Paul II‘s emphasis on transcendent values 
protects him from the more extreme solutions proposed by proponents of the praxis 
model of faith.  
 
Preliminary thoughts on the Praxis Model 
In order for reason to deduce that mistreatment of the poor is injustice, reason must 
build on the foundation of some sort of objective standard or at least draw on an 
established concept of the dignity and equality of all human beings. From the Christian 
premise of an all powerful and all loving God, faced with contemporary examples of 
offenses against human dignity, proponents of this model are not alone in decrying the 
                                                 
348
 Rowland, Culture and the Thomist Tradition after Vatican II, 66. Rowland connects John Paul II‘s 
comments with Alastair MacIntyre‘s critique of ―the ethos of civil society‖.  
349
 Rowland, Culture and the Thomist Tradition after Vatican II, 67. Rowland adds that ―this is essentially 
the same insight as MacIntyre‘s notion of there existing a two-way relationship between virtuous or 
vicious practices and the ethos of institutions.‖ 
350
 Rowland, Culture and the Thomist Tradition after Vatican II, 67. Rowland  believes this insight is 
―more Platonic and Augustinian than Aristotelian‖ and connects it to the thought of ―Morris, Belloc, Gill, 
Chesterton, Day [and] Santamaria.‖ 
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tragedies brought about by injustice.
 351
 But the praxis model seems to utilise reason of a 
sort to imply that some sort of ideology which results in action, correcting the injustice, 
as a legitimate expression of ‗faith‘ in this God. Faith, in this model seems to have a 
negative focus rather than positive. It seems to place the focus of faith on what humans 
should be free from rather that what, or whom, they should be free for. From Greek 
Philosophers arguing for human freedom to pursue the good to the Church arguing for 
freedom to love and serve God and neighbour, the focus remains positive. 
 
The praxis model does seem to reflect an ―authentic, if obscure, perception of the 
dignity of the human person‖352 but it seems that pragmatic reason is elevated into a 
place of prominence over objective truth, revelation or reasoning based on revelation. A 
proponent of this model would need to employ reason to develop a suitable ‗ideology‘ to 
enact that ideology, or at least have considered and accepted someone else‘s, as suitable 
for achieving their pragmatic ends. The praxis model seems optimistic in that it almost 
assumes a kind of ‗right reason‘ in both determining and in applying ideologies to a 
particular context.  
 
                                                 
351
 Joseph Ratzinger, Jesus of Nazareth (London: Bloomsbury, 2007), 31. ―Is there anything more tragic, 
is there anything more opposed to belief in the existence of a good God and a Redeemer of mankind, than 
world hunger? ... Isn‘t the problem of feeding the world – and, more generally, are not social problems – 
the primary, true yardstick by which redemption has to be measured? ... Marxism – quite understandably – 
has made this very point the core of its promise of salvation: It would see to it that no one went hungry 
any more.‖  
352
 Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith Instruction on certain aspects of the “Theology of 
Liberation”, 2. ―This yearning shows the authentic, if obscure, perception of the dignity of the human 
person, created ‗in the image and likeness of God‘ (Genesis 1:26-27), ridiculed and scorned in the midst 
of a variety of different oppressions: cultural, political, racial, social, and economic, often in conjunction 
with one another.‖ 
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The question remains; what is an appropriate ‗ideology‘. If that is to be derived from 
revelation, how does one apprehend, interpret revelation? What is the basis of surety in 
such situations? The proponents of the praxis model do not seem to be interested in 
discussing objective truth as an object of faith. But without any universal guidelines it 
would seem that reason is left to determine not only the pragmatic application of the 
ideology to follow but to determine which ultimate ‗goods‘ one is hoping to protect and 
promote in doing so.  
 
The Praxis Model in Fides et Ratio 
Positive 
The praxis model seems to be proposed in communities where suffering, or at least 
some perceived injustice, is a daily reality. Proponents of the praxis model of faith 
would find some agreement with Fides et Ratio when the encyclical names “the daily 
experience of suffering” as one of the most prominent factors that prompt human beings 
to question the meaning of life.
353
 Since the poor and oppressed are usually the victims 
of those more rich and powerful, they would take heart from the encyclical‟s insistence 
that philosophy is not reserved for an elite few, but is practical wisdom for living for all 
human beings.
354
 This suffering is a direct result of “a disordered exercise of human 
freedom.” The answer to this evil is Jesus Christ, who is “the perfect realization of 
human existence.‖355 
                                                 
353
 F&R, 26. ―The daily experience of suffering—in one's own life and in the lives of others—and the 
array of facts which seem inexplicable to reason are enough to ensure that a question as dramatic as the 
question of meaning cannot be evaded.” 
354
 F&R, 37. ―It was easy to confuse philosophy—understood as practical wisdom and an education for 
life—with a higher and esoteric kind of knowledge, reserved to those few who were perfect.” 
355
 F&R, 80. 
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Since faith in the praxis model is defined as a ‗subversive memory‘ which recalls the 
freedom of Jesus and emancipates us from every kind of enslavement to earthly powers, 
and the encyclical draws our attention to the salvific nature of God‘s intervention in 
history,
356
 a proponent of this model would see the subversive memory of Christ as a 
prompt to act to bring about justice. In this they might find some support in the fact that 
the Church sets great value on reason‘s efforts to ―render people‘s lives ever more 
worthy.‖357 
 
Fides et Ratio insists that the Church has not mandated any one philosophy in exclusion 
of all others,
358
 but encourages her children to present the truth in a way which ―meets 
the needs of our time.‖359 Philosophers are urged to be especially attentive to the issues 
arising in contemporary contexts. In the context of what the encyclical names ―the 
current ferment of ideas‖360 philosophers are reminded that philosophy has a profound 
effect on the development of culture and over personal lives.
361
 It would seem that Fides 
et Ratio is echoing the concerns of a praxis model when it calls for a philosophy which 
will provide “true and planetary ethics which the world now needs.”362 
 
                                                 
356
 F&R, 10. ―Contemplating Jesus as revealer, the Fathers of the Second Vatican Council stressed the 
salvific character of God's Revelation in history” citing Dei Verbum, 2 
357
 F&R, 5. 
358
 F&R, 49. ―The Church has no philosophy of her own nor does she canonize any one particular 
philosophy in preference to others”; also relevant is F&R, 51 “This is why no historical form of 
philosophy can legitimately claim to embrace the totality of truth, nor to be the complete explanation of 
the human being, of the world and of the human being's relationship with God.” 
359
 F&R, 92. ―this certain and unchangeable doctrine, always to be faithfully respected, must be 
understood more profoundly and presented in a way which meets the needs of our time.” 
360
 F&R, 104. 
361
 F&R, 100. ―The importance of philosophical thought in the development of culture and its influence on 
patterns of personal and social behaviour is there for all to see.” 
362
 F&R, 104. 
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This search for a philosophy that answers the questions of a particular culture is hardly 
new. As the encyclical points out, even the evangelists in the Acts of the Apostles 
display evidence of wrestling with the philosophical and cultural insights and problems 
of those they preached to.
363
 The encyclical acknowledges that there is, in every culture, 
―an intrinsic capacity to receive divine revelation‖364 and that theology has always had 
the task of responding to the demands of different cultures.
365
 In a context of injustice of 
oppression it would seem that the proponents of a praxis model could point to the 
encyclical‘s reminder that philosophy has the proper task to make people‘s lives ―ever 
more human‖.366 
 
Perhaps aiming to exercise the freedom and responsibility which surpasses the law
367
 the 
proponents of a praxis model seek a philosophical model which best captures the society 
they live in and the ethical principles required to bring about peace and justice for all.
368
 
 
Negative 
As we have seen, Fides et Ratio points out that reason can make mistakes, and that 
philosophy has taken many a wrong turn in history.
369
 Speaking of the obligation to be 
                                                 
363
 F&R, 36. ―The Acts of the Apostles provides evidence that Christian proclamation was engaged from 
the very first with the philosophical currents of the time” also relevant is F&R, 70 “From the time the 
Gospel was first preached, the Church has known the process of encounter and engagement with 
cultures.” 
364
 F&R, 71. ―Lying deep in every culture, there appears this impulse towards a fulfilment. We may say, 
then, that culture itself has an intrinsic capacity to receive divine Revelation.” 
365
 F&R, 92. ―theology has always had to respond ... to the demands of different cultures, in order then to 
mediate the content of faith to those cultures in a coherent and conceptually clear way.” 
366
 F&R, 70. ―they offer different paths to the truth, which assuredly serve men and women well in 
revealing values which can make their life ever more human.” 
367
 F&R, 68. ―In the New Testament, human life is much less governed by prescriptions than in the Old 
Testament. Life in the Spirit leads believers to a freedom and responsibility which surpass the Law.” 
368
 F&R, 68. ―In other words, moral theology requires a sound philosophical vision of human nature and 
society, as well as of the general principles of ethical decision-making.” 
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vigilant against such errors, the encyclical warns philosophers and theologians not to 
ignore these “erroneous opinions” so they can carry out their duty to defend the truth 
against error.
370
  
 
The proponents of a praxis model may take the Scriptures into account as a “subversive 
memory” but they reject the Scriptural mandate as authoritative in some matters, to 
which the encyclical raises the alarm, citing St Paul, Saint Irenaeus and Tertullian who 
warned against similar relativistic errors in their day.
371
 In doing so they, even while 
trying to achieve a noble goal, damage not only their own philosophy
372
 but also the 
good towards which they are striving.
373
 
 
True philosophy, says Fides et Ratio, must not be so fixed on attempting to be relevant 
to immediate problems as to be lured into inadequate responses
374
 by a mistaken notion 
of “cultural pluralism.”375 It must look to “the truth of the good,”376 knowing that as God 
is absolute,
377
 the truth which draws us to him is true in all places, times and cultures.
378
  
                                                                                                                                               
369
 F&R, 49. ―history shows that philosophy—especially modern philosophy—has taken wrong turns and 
fallen into error.‖ Also relevant here is F&R, 52. ―philosophies developed in ways which were themselves 
erroneous and negative.‖ 
370
F&R, 54. ―Catholic theologians and philosophers, whose grave duty it is to defend natural and 
supernatural truth and instil it in human hearts, cannot afford to ignore these more or less erroneous 
opinions.‖ 
371
 F&R, 37. ―Following Saint Paul, other writers of the early centuries, especially Saint Irenaeus and 
Tertullian, sound the alarm when confronted with a cultural perspective which sought to subordinate the 
truth of Revelation to the interpretation of the philosophers.‖ 
372
 F&R, 75. ―In refusing the truth offered by divine Revelation, philosophy only does itself damage, since 
this is to preclude access to a deeper knowledge of truth.‖ 
373
 F&R, 48. ―Deprived of what Revelation offers, reason has taken side-tracks which expose it to the 
danger of losing sight of its final goal.‖ 
374
 F&R, 97. ―the temptation always remains of understanding these truths in purely functional terms. This 
leads only to an approach which is inadequate, reductive and superficial at the level of speculation.‖ 
375
 F&R, 69. ―Others still, prompted by a mistaken notion of cultural pluralism, simply deny the universal 
value of the Church's philosophical heritage‖, also relevant is F&R, 98 ―Faced with contemporary 
challenges in the social, economic, political and scientific fields, the ethical conscience of people is 
disoriented.‖ 
8 July 2010 Page 81 
 
The encyclical says that the cure to this kind of dogmatic pragmatism,
379
 is a renewed 
focus on metaphysics. 
380
 Only in light of the absolute
381
 can a genuinely practical 
solution be proposed which holds all the human goods in respect without compromising 
one for another.
382
 A philosophy that ignores questions relating to the meaning of life 
would soon become a kind of tool or accessory rather than its proper role in the noble 
search for truth.
383
 As such it would render itself incapable of offering a proper response 
to life‟s questions, or even to the circumstances it seeks to address.384 The truth which 
sets us free is not confined to one culture, nor different for certain historical 
circumstances
 385
 but is declared in public revelation as the same truth for all. To attempt 
to offer freedom on the basis of a „truth‟ dictated by regional or cultural accidents is 
doomed to failure. As the encyclical so eloquently says; “Once the truth is denied to 
                                                                                                                                               
376
 F&R, 98. ―moral theology must turn to a philosophical ethics which looks to the truth of the good, to 
an ethics which is neither subjectivist nor utilitarian.‖ 
377
 F&R, 80. ―It is there that we learn that what we experience is not absolute: it is neither uncreated nor 
self-generating. God alone is the Absolute.‖ 
378
 F&R, 27. ―Every truth—if it really is truth—presents itself as universal, even if it is not the whole 
truth. If something is true, then it must be true for all people and at all times.‖ 
379
 F&R, 97. ―the temptation [to dogmatic pragmatism] always remains of understanding these truths in 
purely functional terms. This leads only to an approach which is inadequate, reductive and superficial.‖ 
380
 F&R, 83. ―A theology without a metaphysical horizon could not move beyond an analysis of religious 
experience, nor would it allow the intellectus fidei to give a coherent account of the universal and 
transcendent value of revealed truth.‖ 
381
 F&R, 27. ―people seek an absolute which might give to all their searching a meaning and an answer—
something ultimate, which might serve as the ground of all things.‖ Also relevant here is F&R, 69 
―philosophical enquiry enables us to discern in different world-views and different cultures “not what 
people think but what the objective truth is”.(93) It is not an array of human opinions but truth alone 
which can be of help to theology.” 
382
F&R, 25. “It is essential, therefore, that the values chosen and pursued in one's life be true, because 
only true values can lead people to realize themselves fully, allowing them to be true to their nature.” 
383
 F&R, 81. ―A philosophy which no longer asks the question of the meaning of life would be in grave 
danger of reducing reason to merely accessory functions, with no real passion for the search for truth.” 
And 47 “instrumental reason”, [is] directed—actually or potentially—towards the promotion of utilitarian 
ends, towards enjoyment or power.” 
384
 F&R, 87. ―By exchanging relevance for truth, this form of modernism shows itself incapable of 
satisfying the demands of truth to which theology is called to respond.” 
385
 F&R, 95. ―Truth can never be confined to time and culture; in history it is known, but it also reaches 
beyond history.” 
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human beings, it is pure illusion to try to set them free. Truth and freedom either go 
together hand in hand or together they perish in misery.”386 
 
It is hardly surprising that the encyclical warns against theology based on local 
problems. Citing Divini Redemptoris,
387
 Fides et Ratio stresses that Catholics are 
warned against an approach that is so focussed on the imminent that it loses sight of, or 
even actively rejects objective truth.
388
 It goes on to explicitly denounce liberation 
theologians (the main proponents of the praxis model) for an uncritical adoption of 
Marxist philosophy.
389
 
 
As we have seen above, the encyclical acknowledges that the immediate experience of 
suffering prompts and to some extent guides our search for truth. In order to guard 
against the imminent dominating our thinking, Fides et Ratio reminds us that the proper 
context for theology is within the Church. The vast array of wisdom, both accumulated 
over the ages and the present contributions of different fields of learning and different 
cultures within the faith, helps theologians avoid the many pitfalls on the path to truth. 
 
Perhaps an answer of a sort might be offered to the liberation theologians from the 
closing paragraphs of Fides et Ratio where the Virgin Mary is offered as an exemplar of 
                                                 
386
 F&R, 90. 
387
 Pope Pius XI Divini Redemptoris (1937), 9. 
388
 F&R, 54. ―Here the pronouncements of Pope Saint Pius X are pertinent, stressing as they did that at the 
basis of Modernism were philosophical claims which were phenomenist, agnostic and immanentist. Nor 
can the importance of the Catholic rejection of Marxist philosophy and atheistic Communism be 
forgotten.” 
389
 F&R, 54. ―the Congregation for the Doctrine of Faith has more recently had to intervene to re-
emphasize the danger of an uncritical adoption by some liberation theologians of opinions and methods 
drawn from Marxism.” Citing Libertatis Nuntius, (1984) in which the Congregation for the Doctrine of 
the Faith warns against certain aspects of liberation theology. 
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wisdom. Though she was persecuted and forced to flee those who would take her Son‟s 
life for their own selfish gain, she offered herself entirely to God, committing herself 
utterly to the truth revealed by the angel. Prudence Allen takes the Pope‟s theme further 
in her discussion of Mary as the „table of wisdom.‟ 390 Portraying Mary holding the 
lifeless body of Christ, freshly taken from his unjust suffering and death on the cross, 
Allen sees the Blessed Virgin as “Mary, the Throne of Wisdom. Her lap becomes 
another table which holds the mystery of death and life.” The encyclical urges 
theologians likewise, to offer their reasoning to God, and with their “fiat” to His divine 
Word, they lose nothing of the autonomy of reason, and gain the very Truth which 
answers all the injustices in the world.
391
 
 
Conclusion to the Praxis Model 
The praxis model displays an optimistic view of reason. By playing down the authority 
of the Church or her teachings, the proponents of this model place their trust in reason to 
determine the object of their ‗faith‘ and, especially, in the practical implementation of 
their stated goals. The model seems to assume some moral principles, such as the 
dignity of every human being, the goods of life, liberty and so on, which should be made 
possible for every human being. Reason is necessary, therefore, for the proponents of 
the praxis model in order to determine and defend these principles and in order to 
                                                 
390
 Prudence Allen, ―Mary and the Vocation of Philosophers ― in New Blackfriars Vol 90 n.1025, (2008), 
65.  
391
F&R, 108. ―Just as the Virgin was called to offer herself entirely as human being and as woman that 
God's Word might take flesh and come among us, so too philosophy is called to offer its rational and 
critical resources that theology, as the understanding of faith, may be fruitful and creative. And just as in 
giving her assent to Gabriel's word, Mary lost nothing of her true humanity and freedom, so too when 
philosophy heeds the summons of the Gospel's truth its autonomy is in no way impaired.” 
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determine, critique, apply and defend a suitable ideology. The praxis model seems to 
rely heavily on practical, or instrumental, reason.   
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The Personalist Model 
The word ―believe‖ in English is etymologically connected to the word ―love‖, just as 
the Latin word credere implies a ―gift of the heart‖.392 To believe, then, means to hold 
the object of belief as dear, preferred, or worthy of allegiance.
393
 Christian faith, 
according to the personalist model, is interpersonal. It sees faith as the union, or at least 
the longing for the eventual union, of the human person with the divine persons. It is a 
―participation in the life of a person, in the mystery of his death and resurrection... and a 
sharing in the life of the three Persons of the Trinity.‖394 
 
According to this model, knowledge comes through faith by way of an intimate 
relationship with God. The earthly analogy that comes closest to explaining this 
relationship is the marital embrace. When Dulles writes ―faith is a total self gift, which 
calls to mind the reciprocal gift of two spouses‖,395 he is reflecting a strong Biblical 
theme. God is presented as the bridegroom to his chosen people in the Old Testament,
396
 
a theme which is further developed in the New Testament,
397
 portraying Christ as the 
bridegroom and his Church as the bride.  The gospel of John in particular, penned by 
                                                 
392
 Marthaler, The Creed – The Apostolic Faith in Contemporary Theology, 19. ―Literally and originally, 
‗to believe‘ means ‗to hold dear.‘ This is the meaning that the German equivalent belieben still has in the 
sense of ‗prefer‘ or ‗give allegiance to.‘‖ 
393
 Marthaler, The Creed – The Apostolic Faith in Contemporary Theology, 19. ―Etymologically, 
―believe‖ is related to a broad range of familiar words, some archaic, like life (dear, willing), some still in 
use, like ‗beloved‘ and ‗love.‘‖ 
394
 Jean Mouroux, I Believe (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1959) as cited in Dulles, The Assurance of 
Things Hoped For, 179. 
395
 Henri de Lubac, The Christian Faith (San Francisco: Ignatius, 1986),145-146 in Dulles, The Assurance 
of Things Hoped For, 179. 
396
 eg. Hos 2:14-16. ―Therefore I am now going to allure her; I will lead her into the desert and speak 
tenderly to her ... In that day, declares the Lord, you will call me ‗my husband‘; you will no longer call me 
‗my master‘‖; Isa 62:5. ―As a bridegroom rejoices over his bride, so will your God rejoice over you.‖ 
397
 eg. Eph 5:22-33 (cf 1 Co 11:3). St Paul compares Christ‘s relationship with his Church with that of a 
husband to a wife. cf. Parables of the ‗bridegroom‘ Mt 25:1-13 and the wedding of the bridegroom to his 
bride in Rev 19:7. 
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―the disciple Jesus loved‖,398 culminates in the resurrected Jesus provoking a threefold 
declaration of love from Peter, a love which is grammatically and theologically linked to 
Peter‘s role as Christ‘s earthly representative, the spiritual head of his bride, the 
Church.
399
  
 
Henri de Lubac (1896-1991) proposed that, in Christianity, the term ‗faith‘ has a 
meaning unparalleled in any other faith or secular context. Christian faith is a total gift 
of oneself in response to God‘s gift of himself in Christ.400 The mutuality of the 
interpersonal gift, initiated by the gracious and loving gift of Christ to us, involves the 
entire human person.
401
 Without being a merely intellectual act, faith involves the 
intellect in belief. Christ is not merely ‗proposed‘ to us but instead enters history and 
calls us into God‘s kingdom, involving a call to every part of his creation, to every one 
of his creatures. 
 
The intellect accepts the testimony of God which also ―resounds in the heart of the 
individual‖ and in the Church‘s confession of faith.402 DeLubac sees this relational 
model as taking humanity back to the intimacy of the pre-fall paradise, where man and 
God related intimately and innocently.
403
 According to Ratzinger, this intimacy is 
                                                 
398
 Jn 13:23, 19:26, 20:2, 21:7, 20, 24. 
399
 Jn 21:15-20. 
400
 cf Gal 2:20. 
401
 Henri de Lubac, Paradoxes of Faith (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1987), 228. ―Faith, if it be really 
faith, is always one, always entire. It envelops the totality of its object – even in those parts of it which 
have not yet been made plain, or in those aspects which have not yet been explored.‖ 
402
 Dulles, The Assurance of Things Hoped For, 133 
403
 de Lubac, Paradoxes of Faith, 216. ―Is it the Father‘s Garden we yearn for, or simply the warmth of 
the maternal breast? Religions – and their modern substitutes – tend to give us back that warmth. To 
remedy our growing old, they bring us back to our first childhood, indeed to our prenatal period. The time 
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―‗more interior‘ to us ‗than we are to ourselves.‘‖404 Not the product of human learning, 
it springs from a ―face-to-face dialogue‖ with Christ our brother and God our loving 
Father.
405
  
 
Although, as we have seen above, the God of the Old Testament displays the same 
intimacy with his people and desire for personal relationship, describing ‗faith‘ as a 
personal intimacy with the divine is only possible in the context of a clear understanding 
of the humanity of the second Person of the Trinity. In contrast with the sense of 
remoteness from God, Karl Adam called attention to Jesus‘ humanity. His divinity is not 
the only, and for this day and time not the most important, aspect of Jesus‘ person. The 
spark in him is the appearance of the divine in the human. Jesus became our brother.
406
 
Only in the eternal word made flesh can we truly meet God ‗face-to-face‘.407 
 
This face-to-face meeting is not a neutral exchange, but a meeting of intimate passionate 
love. In this model of faith the divine communication is not mere propositions. As 
Maurice Blondel (1861-1949) writes ―divine love has found the means of 
                                                                                                                                               
they restore to us is that before our history. Christianity, however, lets us back into the Garden... Through 
is we share once more, not only in the youth of the world, but in the Youth of the Eternal.‖ 
404
 Ratzinger, Jesus of Nazareth, 24. ―[Jesus] stands before us as ―the beloved Son.‖ He is, on one hand, 
the Wholly Other, but by the same token he can become a contemporary of us all, ―more interior‖ to each 
one of us ―than we are to ourselves‖.‖ (Citing Augustine‘s Confessions III, 6, II). 
405
 Ratzinger, Jesus of Nazareth, 7. ―Jesus teaching is not the product of human learning, of whatever 
kind. It originates from immediate contact with the Father, from ―face-to-face‖ dialogue – from the vision 
of the one who rests close to the Father‘s heart. It is the Son‘s word. Without this inner grounding, his 
teaching would be pure presumption.‖ 
406
 Rudolf Schnackenburg, The friend we have in Jesus (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 1997), 
60 
407
 Schnackenburg, The friend we have in Jesus, 59. ―Christ should be seen not only as the divine 
deliverer enthroned at the right hand of the Father but also as one bonded with us, the firstborn among 
many brethren. Otherwise his human friendliness, totally encompassing love, and human nearness are 
slighted. For although we know Jesus as God and man, we must take his humanity seriously.‖ 
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communicating the incommunicable.‖408 God‘s love is powerful and affects profound 
changes in those he loves. According to Blondel, God‘s love is a radical programme of 
divinization.
409
 This intimacy with the divine does not, however, allow for a familiarity 
that breeds contempt. Far from promoting a kind of crass familiarity with ‗my mate 
Jesus,‘ Blondel insists that we cannot enter into this relationship without ―fear and 
trembling‖ before the majesty of God, coming to us.410 But, according to Hans Urs von 
Balthasar (1905-1988), it is losing ourselves in this divine embrace that frees, empowers 
and dignifies our intellect. Citing Bonaventure, he insists that ―the excessus of love, far 
from leaving the reason behind, actually implies the highest form of intelligentia.‖411  
 
Dulles describes a disagreement between Balthasar and certain scholastics who, in his 
opinion, so emphasised the authority of God that they neglected the content of faith.
412
 
Balthasar offers a similar criticism in response to Rahner‘s transcendental theology, 
namely, that Rahner emphasises the experience of faith at the expense of the content, the 
                                                 
408
 Alexander Dru, & Illtyd Trethowan, Trs. Maurice Blondel, The Letter on Apologetics & History and 
Dogma (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1994), 76. ―I believe that divine love has found the means of 
communicating the incommunicable, not in order to oppress and brutalize man, but on the contrary in 
order to join him in the intimacy of a union which cares nothing for difference of essences.‖ 
409
 Olivia Blanchette, Maurice Blondel - A Philosophical Life (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2010), 339. 
―God‘s love is an exacting love. If God humanizes himself  out of love for human beings, it is in order ―to 
divinize us, not metaphorically, not mimetically, not anthropomorphically, but inflexibly, ‗foolishly,‘ by 
crossing the metaphysical abyss, by reversing moral impossibilities, by communicating paradoxically, 
through grace and within the forum of personal secrets and inviolable wills, what is incommunicable by 
nature but still in an order of things, of joys and of goods that can be handed over and given in accordance 
with all propriety.‖ 
410
 Blanchette, Maurice Blondel - A Philosophical Life, 339 
411
 Hans Urs von Balthasar, Theo-Logic III – The Spirit of Truth (San Francisco: Ignatius, 2005), 140. 
―For, according to Thomas, the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit that he sets forth with such genius all serve 
to infuse into our cognitive powers an instinctus that operates by divine love, imprinting the secrets of 
faith upon us and assimilating our inner attitude of faith to the mystery; in Bonaventure the excessus of 
love, far from leaving the reason behind, actually implies the highest form of intelligentia.‖  
412
 Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord: A Theological Aesthetics, vol.1, Seeing the Form (San 
Francisco: Ignatius, 1982), 154. 
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fides qua at the expense of the fides quae.
413
 Just as Balthasar will not divide faith and 
experience , he also refuses to artificially divide faith and knowledge. As we have noted 
above, in the Scriptures, both Old and New Testaments, trust in God‘s promises does 
not exclude knowledge.
414
 Dulles seems to sympathise with the scholastics‘ criticism of 
Balthasar. He insists on more general definitions of faith, not clearly distinguishing it 
from hope, trust, love, obedience, assent and contemplation.  
 
Preliminary thoughts on the Personalist Model 
This model of faith seems to engage the entire being of a person in an act of self giving, 
which necessarily involves reason as both gift and at least joint agent of giving. This 
model portrays an integrated faith, hope and love engaging the entire person in 
communion with the divine. It links ‗knowing‘ the object of faith with loving the same 
object. In fact it asserts that we cannot truly know without the complete self giving of 
love and the loving reception of the other.  
 
Far from eliminating reason on the basis that ‗love is blind‘, this model presumes a 
relationship which is at least comprehensible enough to us to allow us to commit 
ourselves utterly to the divine person. Faith, in this model, engages our reason, memory 
and will completely in this living and active love with God. Reason is not reduced to a 
single act of surrender. Instead, this model describes reason as thriving, even soaring to 
its full potential once transformed by the love of its object. It could be argued that such a 
focus on the relational aspect of faith might possibly allow a neglect of the precision of 
                                                 
413
 Dulles, The Assurance of Things Hoped For, 148.  
414
 Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord: A Theological Aesthetics, vol.1, Seeing the Form, 592 & 134 for Old 
Testament and New Testament respectively cf. Dulles, The Assurance of Things Hoped For, 149.  
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revealed truth, but a proper focus on the object of our affection and belief would surely 
engage one in a closer and more sincere study of everything we know our divine spouse 
wishes us to know of himself. 
 
This model has profound implications for the sharing of the faith with others. At first 
glance it may seem that a person could only describe how this faith-love ‗feels‘ inside in 
terms of a racing heart, warm flushes, or turmoil in the stomach when confronted by the 
object of affection (which, when described to a doctor would likely result in a 
prescription for antibiotics). Most lovers, even in mundane relationships, would try 
instead to tell you about the one to whom they are prepared to entrust their entire life 
and future happiness; not so much to convince their interlocutor that their choice is 
based on firm grounds, but to articulate something of the attributes of their loved one 
which has drawn them to this state of devotion.  
 
The Personalist model in Fides et Ratio 
Positive 
At the very beginning of human beings‘ struggle to understand themselves in order to 
understand the meaning of life,
415
 they begin to understand that their search is one 
common to all humanity. That is, they share basic conditions of existence, experiences, 
and similar struggle for meaning with their fellow human beings. Set within the context 
of a community of beings who draw comfort and inspiration from the fact that others 
share a similar journey of discovery, they find they key to discovery within their 
                                                 
415
 F&R, 1. 
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relationship with others.
416
 According to Fides et Ratio human beings are, to a certain 
extent, defined by relationship. As the encyclical says ―human beings are not made to 
live alone.‖417 Living within these relationships would be impossible if an individual 
insisted on personally verifying every proposition with objective criteria, and so it is life 
in relationships that teaches human beings trust in the other as one of the keys to human 
existence.
418
 Even the specific search of an individual is assisted and enhanced by 
―trusting dialogue and sincere friendship‖, whereas a climate of isolation on the grounds 
of distrust would undermine the search.
419
  
 
The encyclical cites Saint Bonaventure to show that the interpersonal skills learned 
through human relationships are essential in the search for truth
420
 because the search 
for truth is a search to enter into a profound relationship with a person.
421
 As the 
                                                 
416
 F&R, 4. ―These fundamental elements of knowledge spring from the wonder awakened in them by the 
contemplation of creation: human beings are astonished to discover themselves as part of the world, in a 
relationship with others like them, all sharing a common destiny.” 
417
 F&R, 31. Also relevant is F&R, 32. ―Human perfection, then, consists not simply in acquiring an 
abstract knowledge of the truth, but in a dynamic relationship of faithful self-giving with others.” 
418
 F&R, 31. ―Nonetheless, there are in the life of a human being many more truths which are simply 
believed than truths which are acquired by way of personal verification. Who, for instance, could assess 
critically the countless scientific findings upon which modern life is based? Who could personally 
examine the flow of information which comes day after day from all parts of the world and which is 
generally accepted as true? Who in the end could forge anew the paths of experience and thought which 
have yielded the treasures of human wisdom and religion? This means that the human being—the one 
who seeks the truth—is also the one who lives by belief.” 
419
 F&R, 33. ―Reason too needs to be sustained in all its searching by trusting dialogue and sincere 
friendship. A climate of suspicion and distrust, which can beset speculative research, ignores the teaching 
of the ancient philosophers who proposed friendship as one of the most appropriate contexts for sound 
philosophical enquiry.” 
420
 F&R, 105. ―Saint Bonaventure ... invites the reader to recognize the inadequacy of “reading without 
repentance, knowledge without devotion, research without the impulse of wonder, prudence without the 
ability to surrender to joy, action divorced from religion, learning sundered from love, intelligence 
without humility” (quoting Bonaventure). 
421
 F&R, 32. ―It should be stressed that the truths sought in this interpersonal relationship are not primarily 
empirical or philosophical. Rather, what is sought is the truth of the person—what the person is and what 
the person reveals from deep within.” 
8 July 2010 Page 92 
encyclical points out it is in the contemplation of God‟s love for humanity that we 
discover the meaning of true love,
422
 which urges humanity on towards the truth.
423
 
 
While this relational model of knowing may seem less exact than, for example, the 
precision of the propositional model, it seems to draw a person to a deeper and richer 
level of understanding than can be achieved by evidence or adherence to dogmatic 
statements. A personal relationship draws the person into an intimacy with The Truth.
424
 
As Saint Anselm says, the more the intellect learns to love the truth, the more urgently it 
seeks the truth.
425
 As people entrust themselves to this relationship, they learn to know 
and love the truth, and eagerly embrace it for themselves.
426
 
 
The search for truth is, in fact, intimately linked with the search for a person who to 
whom we can completely trust.
427
 This is why the priority of Christian preachers has 
always been to invite people into a personal encounter with the Risen Christ. The 
relationship itself brings about the “conversion of heart” which leads the new believer to 
seek to know various particulars of the truth out of love for the one who is the whole 
                                                 
422
 F&R, 7. ―As the source of love, God desires to make himself known; and the knowledge which the 
human being has of God perfects all that the human mind can know of the meaning of life.” 
423
 F&R, 107. ―I ask everyone to look more deeply at man, whom Christ has saved in the mystery of his 
love, and at the human being's unceasing search for truth and meaning.” 
424
 F&R, 32. ―Belief is often humanly richer than mere evidence, because it involves an interpersonal 
relationship and brings into play not only a person's capacity to know but also the deeper capacity to 
entrust oneself to others, to enter into a relationship with them which is intimate and enduring.” 
425
 F&R, 42. 
426
 Weinandy summarises Webster‘s objections to the ‗phenomenological anthropology‘ underpinning 
Fides et Ratio by saying he believes John Paul II has undermined the ‗biblical truth‘ of man as the hearer 
of the word.‖ Weinandy, Thomas ―Fides et Ratio: A Response to Thomas Webster‖ New Blackfriars Vol. 
81, n.952, 2000, 232. Weinandy suggests that John Paul II could have legitimately supported his 
anthropology by a study of Genesis 1:26-27. 
427
 F&R, 33. ―Men and women are on a journey of discovery which is humanly unstoppable—a search for 
the truth and a search for a person to whom they might entrust themselves.” 
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truth.
428
 It is this love that provides the transformation and illumination so valued by 
proponents of the transcendental model of faith.
429
  
 
The encyclical drives this point home by offering the example of the martyrs. It is only 
with an understanding of faith as a relationship with the divine person of truth that we 
can we properly understand why neither suffering, nor even a horrid death could shake 
the martyrs‟ love for the truth.430  
 
This analogy of faith as a relationship does not discount reason in favour of a kind of 
emotive attachment to truth. Faith cannot do without reason, nor can reason do without 
faith.
431
 While distinguishing between the two, faith and reason work in “mutual 
friendship”, each with its own role and importance.432 Fides et Ratio offers the Virgin 
Mary as the clear demonstration that a relationship involves the gift of the entire person, 
including the ability to reason.
433
 Just as Mary gave herself utterly over to the truth, in 
                                                 
428
 F&R, 38. ―The first and most urgent task was the proclamation of the Risen Christ by way of a 
personal encounter which would bring the listener to conversion of heart and the request for Baptism.” 
429
 F&R, 43. ―Illumined by faith, reason is set free from the fragility and limitations deriving from the 
disobedience of sin and finds the strength required to rise to the knowledge of the Triune God.” Also 
relevant here is F&R, 22 “The coming of Christ was the saving event which redeemed reason from its 
weakness, setting it free from the shackles in which it had imprisoned itself.” 
430
 F&R, 32. 
431
 F&R, 48. ―Deprived of what Revelation offers, reason has taken side-tracks which expose it to the 
danger of losing sight of its final goal. Deprived of reason, faith has stressed feeling and experience, and 
so run the risk of no longer being a universal proposition.” 
432
 F&R, 57. ―Just when Saint Thomas distinguishes perfectly between faith and reason”, the Pope writes, 
“he unites them in bonds of mutual friendship, conceding to each its specific rights and to each its specific 
dignity.” 
433
 F&R, 108. ―Just as the Virgin was called to offer herself entirely as human being and as woman that 
God's Word might take flesh and come among us, so too philosophy is called to offer its rational and 
critical resources that theology, as the understanding of faith, may be fruitful and creative.” 
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order to bear The Truth in her womb, the Church sees the act of any person entrusting 
themselves to God as an act engaging the entire person.
434
  
 
It is to the Truth born in Mary‘s womb that the Church points all truth seekers. God has 
revealed himself finally and definitively in the person of His Son, Jesus Christ.
435
 As 
Augustine points out in his rebuke of the Platonists, it is foolish to seek the truth but 
reject the Word made flesh.
436
 It is in the Word made flesh that we encounter the 
―enduring and definitive synthesis‖ which could not be reached by human reason alone. 
437
 Indeed, we are able to come to a deeper understanding of God through relationship 
than we could through mere propositions.
438
 God chose to reveal Himself most clearly in 
the incarnation of the second Person of the Blessed Trinity
439
 and it is here that ―the 
Whole lies hidden in the part, God takes on a human face.”440 Through Christ, human 
beings now have access to both Him, the Father and the Spirit.
441
  
 
                                                 
434
 F&R, 13. ―The Church has always considered the act of entrusting oneself to God to be a moment of 
fundamental decision which engages the whole person.” Cf Allen, Prudence, “Mary and the Vocation of 
Philosophers” for an excellent discussion on Mary as the “table of wisdom” in F&R, 108; See also 
Meconi, David Vincent SJ, ―Philosophari in Maria – And Mary as the Model of Created Wisdom‖ in 
Foster, David Ruel, & Koterski, Joseph W. Eds.The two wings of Catholic thought: essays on Fides et 
Ratio (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 2003). 
435
 F&R, 9 (citing 1 Jn 5:9; Jn 5:31-32). 
436
 F&R, 40. ―Though he accorded the Platonists a place of privilege, Augustine rebuked them because, 
knowing the goal to seek, they had ignored the path which leads to it: the Word made flesh.” 
437
 F&R,, 12. ―In the Incarnation of the Son of God we see forged the enduring and definitive synthesis 
which the human mind of itself could not even have imagined.” 
438
 F&R, 32. ―Belief is often humanly richer than mere evidence, because it involves an interpersonal 
relationship and brings into play not only a person's capacity to know but also the deeper capacity to 
entrust oneself to others, to enter into a relationship with them which is intimate and enduring.” 
439
 F&R, 11. ―The truth about himself and his life which God has entrusted to humanity is immersed 
therefore in time and history; and it was declared once and for all in the mystery of Jesus of Nazareth.” 
440
 F&R, 12. 
441
 F&R, 7. ―through Christ, the Word made flesh, man has access to the Father in the Holy Spirit and 
comes to share in the divine nature.” Also relevant here is F&R, 11 “To see Jesus is to see his Father (Jn 
14:9).” 
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In Christ, human beings do not merely come to knowledge of God that makes salvation 
possible. Knowing God personally, as it were, people come to realise that God reveals 
himself precisely in that salvific act.
442
 The divine self revelation in the incarnation of 
Christ reveals a God who not only wants to be known by us, but also reveals his divine 
purpose in doing so. The divine purpose is to invite us into communion with himself , 
for eternity.
443
 
 
It is only Christ‘s transformation of suffering and death into the saving act of a loving 
God that answers the deepest questions raised by our own suffering.
444
 God‘s answer is 
a person. People come to know the mystery of the Word made flesh in his incarnation, 
life, passion, death and ascension
445
 and in knowing this Person mankind finds meaning 
and peace.
446
 Even so, Fides et Ratio insists that our understanding of this mystery will 
be severely hampered if we ignore the contribution of philosophy. Our human mind 
finds it difficult to grasp that suffering and death can express a gracious self giving 
                                                 
442
 F&R, 10. ―By this Revelation, then, the deepest truth about God and human salvation is made clear to 
us in Christ, who is the mediator and at the same time the fullness of all Revelation.” 
443
 F&R, 10. ―Out of the abundance of his love speaks to men and women... so that he may invite and take 
them into communion with himself.” Also relevant here is F&R, 11 “The whole work of creation and 
salvation comes to light; and it emerges clearly above all that, with the Incarnation of the Son of God, our 
life is even now a foretaste of the fulfilment of time which is to come.” 
444
 F&R, 12. ―Where might the human being seek the answer to dramatic questions such as pain, the 
suffering of the innocent and death, if not in the light streaming from the mystery of Christ's Passion, 
Death and Resurrection?” 
445
 F&R, 93. ―The approach to this mystery begins with reflection upon the mystery of the Incarnation of 
the Son of God: his coming as man, his going to his Passion and Death, a mystery issuing into his glorious 
Resurrection and Ascension to the right hand of the Father.” 
446
 F&R, 24. ―Almighty and eternal God, you created mankind so that all might long to find you and have 
peace when you are found” (citing a prayer from Good Friday liturgy). 
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love,
447
 and yet, without the contribution of philosophy a coherent understanding of this 
mystery will not be possible.
448
 
 
The sacramental character of revelation invites human beings to look past the outward 
signs and into a deeper relationship with the personal God who has offered himself in 
this way for all, and continues to offer Himself in the Eucharist.
449
 
 
Fides et Ratio insists that ―the intimate essence of God and of the human being become 
intelligible: in the mystery of the Incarnate Word.”450 Not only do we come to see God‟s 
self revelation in Christ but also the revelation of everything we are as human beings 
and, more importantly, everything God has created us to be.
451
 Grasping the reality of 
God revealed in Christ is embracing the truth of our own existence.
452
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 F&R, 23. ―The true key-point, which challenges every philosophy, is Jesus Christ's death on the Cross. 
It is here that every attempt to reduce the Father's saving plan to purely human logic is doomed to failure.” 
448
 F&R, 93. ―The human mind, which finds it inconceivable that suffering and death can express a love 
which gives itself and seeks nothing in return. ... a coherent solution to them will not be found without 
philosophy's contribution.” And 23. “In order to express the gratuitous nature of the love revealed in the 
Cross of Christ, the Apostle is not afraid to use the most radical language of the philosophers in their 
thinking about God. Reason cannot eliminate the mystery of love which the Cross represents, while the 
Cross can give to reason the ultimate answer which it seeks.” 
449
 F&R, 13. ―Just as Jesus Christ went unrecognized among men, so does his truth appear without 
external difference among common modes of thought. So too does the Eucharist remain among common 
bread.” 
450
 F&R, 80. 
451
 F&R, 80. ―In the end, the word of God poses the problem of the meaning of life and proffers its 
response in directing the human being to Jesus Christ, the Incarnate Word of God, who is the perfect 
realization of human existence.” 
452
 F&R, 15. ―The truth of Christian Revelation, found in Jesus of Nazareth, enables all men and women 
to embrace the “mystery” of their own life” and 80 “The intimate essence of God and of the human being 
become intelligible: in the mystery of the Incarnate Word.” 
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Negative 
Though it seems strongly in favour of a personalist perspective, Fides et Ratio 
acknowledges our understanding is negatively affected by the limits of human reason,
453
 
the ―inconsistency of the heart‖454 and overwhelmed by ―a welter of concerns.‖455 The 
encyclical also acknowledges that knowledge obtained via a personal relationship with 
the divine is ―an imperfect form of knowledge.‖456 Such knowledge is ―not primarily 
empirical or philosophical.‖457 Admittedly, this is not so much a point against the 
personalist model as a warning that intimacy without attention to precise definitions 
could lead to dangerous false confidence in mistaken beliefs.  
 
Fides et Ratio warns that enjoying an intimate relationship with a personal God does not 
dispense with the need for philosophy‘s continued search for precision in understanding 
and expressing truth. Citing early Christianity‘s initial disinterest on the basis that ―a 
satisfying answer to the hitherto unresolved question of life's meaning that delving into 
the philosophers seemed to them something remote and in some ways outmoded,”458 the 
encyclical argues that it would be a major mistake to abandon the search to understand 
                                                 
453
 F&R, 13. ―It is true that Jesus, with his entire life, revealed the countenance of the Father, for he came 
to teach the secret things of God. But our vision of the face of God is always fragmentary and impaired by 
the limits of our understanding.” 
454
 F&R, 28. ―The natural limitation of reason and the inconstancy of the heart often obscure and distort a 
person's search.” 
455
 F&R, 28. ―Truth can also drown in a welter of other concerns. People can even run from the truth as 
soon as they glimpse it because they are afraid of its demands.” 
456
 F&R, 32. ―On the one hand, the knowledge acquired through belief can seem an imperfect form of 
knowledge, to be perfected gradually through personal accumulation of evidence.” 
457
 F&R, 32. ―It should be stressed that the truths sought in this interpersonal relationship are not primarily 
empirical or philosophical.” 
458
 F&R, 38. ―The encounter with the Gospel offered such a satisfying answer to the hitherto unresolved 
question of life's meaning that delving into the philosophers seemed to them something remote and in 
some ways outmoded.” 
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truth by philosophy, imagining that intimacy with the Truth Himself absolved us from 
the search.  
 
As we have noted above, human relationships can be clouded by the same sin that 
clouds our reasoning.
459
 Even having the amazing gift of a personal relationship with the 
one who is Truth, we require the objective propositions of truth, together with the 
interpretation and guidance of the Magisterium, to keep our relationship purely focussed 
on this Truth. It is perhaps in this personalist model of faith that the need for a clear 
theology focussing on the truth who is the Word made flesh is most pressing. Prudence 
Allen invokes the portrayal of Mary and the Devil locking eyes in the crowds 
surrounding Christ‘s way of the cross in the movie The Passion of the Christ as an 
artistic portrayal of John Paul II‘s point,  
 
Catholic theologians and philosophers, whose grave duty it is to 
defend natural and supernatural truth and instil it in human hearts, 
cannot afford to ignore these more or less erroneous opinions.
 460
 
 
It is the particular role of Theologians, says Allen, to lock eyes with the devil and 
denounce his deception, while pointing and leading all to her son, the Son of God, The 
Truth and our salvation.
461
 
 
 
                                                 
459
 F&R, 51. ―it is necessary to keep in mind the unity of truth, even if its formulations are shaped by 
history and produced by human reason wounded and weakened by sin.” Also relevant here is F&R, 13 “If 
human beings with their intelligence fail to recognize God as Creator of all, it is not because they lack the 
means to do so, but because their free will and their sinfulness place an impediment in the way.” 
460
 F&R, 54. ―Catholic theologians and philosophers, whose grave duty it is to defend natural and 
supernatural truth and instill it in human hearts, cannot afford to ignore these more or less erroneous 
opinions.” 
461
 Allen, ―Mary and the Vocation of Philosophers ― in New Blackfriars, 64. 
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Conclusion to the Personalist Model  
The personalist model is not only positive and optimistic about reason but it portrays 
reason as an integral part of the entire human being‘s action in faith. Reason must first 
determine the object of faith is a personal God, who desires a relationship with those he 
created. Further still, reason must deduce that this relationship has been made possible 
for us by God. The act of faith then becomes an act of total self giving over to this 
personal God. This complete submission of self to the loving embrace of a personal God 
necessarily engages human reason. Just as a lover seeks to understand and please her 
beloved, so the believer seeks to understand and please his/her God. Reason is actively 
engaged in efforts to comprehend and think with the personal God who is the object of 
faith. In the understanding of the personalist model, this complete self giving fulfils and 
enhances the entire person, including the capacity to reason, and raises our humanity to 
what it was intended to be. Thus reason is enhanced, elevated and freed to truly 
comprehend the truth about the object of faith, the beloved and personal God. 
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Thesis Conclusion 
This study adopted the models of faith described by Avery Dulles in The Assurance of 
Things Hoped For as a convenient means of surveying a broad range of understandings 
of ―faith‖ in the context of the Christian religion. Each of Dulles‘ models was briefly 
described, including some examples from proponents of the respective models, some 
preliminary observations about the relationship between faith and reason in the 
respective models were offered; and, finally, by examining the Church‘s teaching on 
faith and reason in Fides et Ratio, the relationship between faith and reason according to 
each model was discussed. The specific questions in each case were, 
Whether ―faith‖ is compatible with reason 
Whether ―faith‖ requires reason. 
 
Although the fiducial and obediential models share a certain pessimism regarding 
reason, neither denounces reason entirely. Both models of faith place a great deal of 
importance on revelation as the only reliable source of truth. Proponents of both models, 
therefore, require reason to decipher and interpret revelation, to apply it to their own 
situations and to involve reason in the complete abandonment of self to God. The single 
self determining act of surrender to God is an act of the whole human person, including 
the action and participation of the intellect and will. Reason is, therefore, utilised as a 
tool of this method, even if not trusted as a reliable source of truth in itself. 
 
On the other hand, the transcendental, affective/experiential and praxis models share a 
certain optimism in regards to reason. In their various ways, these models of faith 
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express a sincere longing for the truth, while all downplaying, if not rejecting, the role of 
Christ‘s guiding hand in the authority of divine revelation and magisterial authority. The 
affective/experiential model relies heavily on reason to discern meaningful experiences 
from random happenstance. The praxis model relies on reason to determine the best 
possible ideology to achieve the goals set, and relies heavily on practical reason to 
implement that ideology. The transcendental model places great hope in reason to see 
past the mundane problems and experiences of life to the transcendent truth in and 
beyond them. Reason in the transcendental model is supernaturally enhanced, 
enlightened and trusted to soar to the contemplation of transcendent truth. 
 
The propositional model, together with the personalist model, portray revelation as 
much more authoritative than it is portrayed in the affective/experiential, praxis and 
transcendental models, but do not attempt to exclude reason in the manner of the 
fiducial and obediential models. Reason is emphasised most purely in the propositional 
model in that it specifically insists on the reasonableness of faith. The propositionalists 
rely on the coherence of God‘s revealed truth with truth obtained from all sources, 
encouraging reason to seek and assimilate the truth it finds, guided by the magisterial 
authority of the Church, into the life of Christian faith. The personalist model also 
displays a strong belief in the coherence of God‘s revelation with the world, but focuses 
specifically on the truth of the human person in relationship with a personal God, 
especially in the ‗Word made flesh‘. That God wishes to engage the entire human 
person in a deep and intimate relationship, encompassing all aspects of that human 
person, necessarily involves and enhances reason, encouraging and enabling reason to 
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soar to its full potential in contemplation of the God who is the object of his/her faith 
and love. 
 
It is evident that all models of faith presented and studied in this paper are compatible 
with reason and, in fact, require reason to be attempted, let alone successfully 
implemented. This thesis has argued that, not only is faith compatible with reason, but 
that all models of faith described by Dulles require reason. 
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